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Faced with an impending Medicare "crisis," scholars and 
policymakers have advanced a variety of proposals for reforming the 
program. This Note critically examines one proposed solution that draws 
on an established technique of health policy and insurance-beneficiary 
cost-sharing-to reduce expenditures in the rapidly-growing Medicare 
home health program. Recognizing that cost-sharing mechanisms might 
generate some savings, the author ultimately rejects these proposed 
remedies in light of their inequitable consequences and practical 
/imitations. 
This Note proceeds by establishing a normative framework for 
assessing cost-sharing proposals. The author then evaluates the normative 
implications of an array of cost-sharing mechanisms, taking into account 
the unique demographic and usage characteristics of the beneficiary 
population. Drawing on empirical research into the effects of cost-sharing 
on such variables as income and health status, this Note explores the 
demand response of beneficiaries. The author concludes that cost-sharing 
likely would be either ineffective or inequitable. In contrast, alternative 
reform proposals are likely to generate cost-savings without the normative 
limitations of beneficiary cost-sharing. This Note urges the abandonment 
of attempts to extend cost-sharing to the home health benefit, and calls for 
a further exploration of alternative methods to assume the program 's long-
term solvency. 
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Introduction
Faced with consistent increases in program spending and even higher
future costs, the Medicare program is undeniably at a cross-roads. Total
Medicare expenditures grew by a yearly average of 8.5% between 1990
and 1996,' and demographic projections regarding the "aging" of the U.S.
I See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN. & OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, A PROFILE
OF MEDICARE: 1998 CHART BOOK 25 (1998) [hereinafter MEDICARE PROFILE]; MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMM'N, HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM: A DATA BOOK 24
cht.A-4 (1998) [hereinafter MEDPAC DATA BOOK]. However, growth in per enrollee Medicare
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population have led many to predict much higher future outlays and an
impending "Medicare crisis.",2 Among the many possible areas for reform,
Medicare funding for home health care has proven a particularly attractive
candidate. In recent years, post-acute services, which include home health
care, skilled nursing facilities (SNF), 3 and hospice programs,4 have been
the fastest growing components of Medicare.5 Average annual growth of
expenditure per enrollee in these programs between 1990 and 1996 was
27.9%, 23.2%, and 33.1%, respectively.6 Furthermore, total Medicare
spending on home health care has grown-in the words of one critic-
"exponentially," rising from $2.5 billion in 1989 to $16.8 billion in 1996.7
In addition to these cost increases, widespread allegations of fraud and
abuse by home health agencies (HHAs) have lent impetus to reform
proposals. 8
The congressional and administrative response to these developments
has been swift and far-reaching. The passage of the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 (BBA)9 responded to the dramatic increase in home health
reimbursement costs by calling for the introduction of a prospective
payment system (PPS) for the home health program by October 1, 1999.'
spending, measured in real terms, has been slightly lower. See MEDPAC DATA BOOK, supra, at 8
cht.1-7.
2 Under one model, the Brookings-ICF-Long-Term Care Financing Model, the number of
persons over 65 years of age is projected to grow from 32.7 million in 1993 to 49.2 million in 2018, a
50% increase in 25 years. See JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., SHARING THE BURDEN: STRATEGIES FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 36-37 (1994). In light of such projections, the
notion of an impending "Medicare crisis" has permeated public and scholarly discourse. See, e.g., Tom
Curry, Rethinking Medicare, MSNBC (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http://www.msnbc.com/news/136650.asp> (discussing an impending "Medicare crisis").
3 Commonly referred to as a "nursing home," the SNF is defined under the Medicare
statute as "an institution ... which (1) is primarily engaged in providing to residents (A) skilled
nursing care and related services for residents who require medical or nursing care, or (B)
rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons, and is not primarily
for the care and treatment of mental diseases." 42 U.S.C.A. § 13951-3(a) (West Supp. 1999).
4 Under the Medicare statute, "hospice care" encompasses an array of services to the
terminally ill. Covered services include nursing care, physical or occupational therapy, medical social
services, home health aide services, medical supplies, physician services, and short-term inpatient care.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(l) (1994).
5 MEDICARE PROFILE, supra note I at 25.
6 See id., at 34 fig.22.
7 H. Gilbert Welch et al., The Use of Medicare Home Health Care Services, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 324, 324 (1996).
8 See GAO, GAO/HEHS-97-108, MEDICARE: NEED TO HOLD HOME HEALTH AGENCIES
MORE ACCOUNTABLE FOR INAPPROPRIATE BILLINGS 23 (1997); GAO, GAO/OSI-95-17, MEDICARE:
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ABC HOME HEALTH CARE 2-3 (1995); Executives for Home Health Agency
Convicted for Defrauding Medicare, MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 959-60 (Aug. 11, 1995).
9 Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
10 See Balanced Budget Act § 4603 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395fff (West
Supp. 1999)). A PPS operates by setting payment rates in advance of the actual provision of medical
services to patients. In theory, providers have an incentive to reduce costs under the PPS; assuming
their costs are below the PPS payment rates, they can pocket the difference. The PPS for the Medicare
home health benefit is to be designed to achieve an overall reduction in provider expenditures
equivalent to a 15% reduction in the cost limits and per beneficiary limits put in place under the
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During the transition to this PPS, the BBA instituted an Interim Payment
System (IPS) to control reimbursement costs, while initiating more
stringent eligibility requirements and other guidelines.1'
In addition, numerous anti-fraud initiatives have been introduced.
Operation Restore Trust, a joint federal-state initiative, exposed very high
rates of HHA noncompliance with Medicare's coverage criteria, putting
those providers who engaged in fraudulent practices on notice for their
misconduct. 12 Furthermore, the passage of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 3 in 1996 initiated a strengthening of the
existing Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Law 14 by instituting a general
crack-down on health-care fraud and by creating new categories of federal
crimes for health care providers. 5 In addition, the BBA itself created new
civil penalties for violations of the Anti-Kickback Law, while
strengthening other existing penalties. 16 Moreover, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Health and Human
Interim Payment System, see infra notes 11, 222-23 and accompanying text, by fiscal year (FY) 2000.
See Balanced Budget Act § 4603(a). The BBA also included a contingency provision in case the
Health Care Financing Administration failed to implement and design the PPS by Oct. 1, 1999. Such a
failure would result in an automatic 15% reduction in the cost limits and per beneficiary limits
articulated under the Act. See id. § 4603(e). For more detailed discussion of the PPS, see infra Part
VI.A.
II Whereas HHAs previously were paid their actual costs up to a cap based on 112% of the
national average cost per visit, adjusted for local wage levels and each agency's mix and number of
visits, the BBA decreased this cap to 105% of the national median per visit cost. See Balanced Budget
Act § 4602 (a)(5) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(1)(L)(i) (West Supp. 1999)). The
BBA also added an average annual per beneficiary limit to the calculation of the payment cap. This per
beneficiary limit is based on the average payment for home health services for each beneficiary
receiving care during an agency's fiscal year ending before October 1, 1994. Agencies participating a
full year before this date ("established" agencies) faced limits based 75% on 98% of the "reasonable
costs" for the agency's 12-month cost-reporting period, and 25% on 98% of the regional average per
beneficiary payment for the same period. See id. § 4602(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395x(v)(I)(L)(v) (West Supp. 1999)). An agency that had not participated in Medicare for a full year
by October 1994 is considered "new," and faces a per beneficiary limit based on the national median of
the per beneficiary limits for established agencies. See id.; see also GAO, GAO/HEHS-98-238,
MEDICARE HOME HEALTH BENEFIT: IMPACT OF INTERIM PAYMENT SYSTEM AND AGENCY CLOSURES
ON ACCESS TO SERVICES 5 (1998) [hereinafter IMPACT OF INTERIM PAYMENT].
12 In 1995, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) put the home health industry on notice
regarding fraudulent and abusive practices. See OIG Special Fraud Alert, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,847 (Dep't
Health and Human Serv. 1995).
13 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in relevant part at 42
U.S.C.A. § 210 (West Supp. 1999)).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1994); see also Balanced Budget Act § 4331 (strengthening
HIPAA provisions).
15 The Act amended U.S.C. Title 18 to include, for example, "health care fraud," 18
U.S.C.A. § 1347 (West Supp. 1999), "theft or embezzlement relating to health care," 18 U.S.C.A. §
669 (West Supp. 1999), and "false statements relating to health care matters," 18 U.S.C.A. § 1035
(West Supp. 1999); see also Jerome T. Levy, Use of Compliance Programs; Offers Benefits to
Providers, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at 7.
16 Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 4331(d) (codified as amended in relevant part at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7e (West Supp. 1999)). The BBA also introduced a surety bond requirement to deter
further fraudulent practices. See id. § 4312(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(o) (West
Supp. 1999)).
140
The Price of Reform
Services (HHS) has called for enhanced disclosure by health-care
providers, and has set forth measures by which home health suppliers can
police themselves while devoting more time to the education of staff and
contractors regarding the compliance demands of Medicare and Medicaid
regulations.' 7 Finally, regulatory measures enacted by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) following the BBA may have been
effective in stemming fraud and abuse.' 8
These anti-fraud measures, in tandem with the rigid IPS criteria,
already seem to have mitigated growth in Medicare home health costs and
in the number of HHA openings.' 9 Indeed, these measures have led a
significant number of HHAs to end their Medicare participation,
20
incurring the wrath of the home health industry2' and prompting Congress
to moderate some of the more draconian IPS requirements.22 Given the
17 As part of "Operation Restore Trust," the OIG has initiated a voluntary self-disclosure
protocol for health care providers. See 0IG Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399
(Dep't Health and Human Serv. 1998). The 0IG further outlined a Compliance Program Guidance for
Home Health Agencies, detailing compliance measures-including education of staff and
contractors-that HHAs are encouraged to adopt to guard against fraud. See 0IG Compliance Program
Guidance for Home Health Agencies, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,410 (Dep't Health and Human Serv. 1998).
18 HCFA placed a moratorium on certification of any new home health agencies for the six
months following September 15, 1997. Moreover, HCFA also now requires agencies to reapply every
three years for continued certification and has increased both the number of audits of HHAs and the
number of claims reviews conducted by the government. See HARRIET L. KOMISAR & JUDITH FEDER,
THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1997: EFFECTS ON MEDICARE'S HOME
HEALTH BENEFIT AND BENEFICIARIES WHO NEED LONG-TERM CARE 12-13 (1998); Amy Goldstein,
President Acts To Curb Home Health Care Fraud, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at A4.
19 Between 1995 and 1996, growth had already begun to slow, with Medicare home health
outlays rising only 8%. The number of HHAs participating in Medicare grew 33.3% between October
1, 1994 (7920) and October 1, 1997 (10,557). However, the number of participating HHAs operating
in August 1, 1998 was only 9842-a 6.8% decrease. See IMPACT OF INTERIM PAYMENT, supra note 11,
app.IV, at 24-25. While recognizing the possible role of both Operation Restore Trust measures and
IPS payment limitations in the recent downturn, a GAO official noted other possible factors, including
the "increased use of managed care and the maturation of the home health industry." GAO, GAO/T-
HEHS-98-234, MEDICARE: INTERIM PAYMENT SYSTEM FOR HOME HEALTH AGENCIES 5 (1998).
20 The GAO found 554 HHA "voluntary closures" and 206 "involuntary closures" (i.e.,
situations in which agencies were no longer permitted to bill Medicare because of failure to meet
program requirements) nationwide between October 1997 and July 1998. See IMPACT OF INTERIM
PAYMENT, supra note 11, at 3. This figure is significantly below initial industry calculations for the
same period, which (erroneously) had indicated 2704 closures. See B. Schorr, Has IPS Killed 2,704
HHAs? Study by 2 HHA Execs Included Branches, Pre-IPS Closings, HOME HEALTH LINE, Feb. 22,
1999, at 3-4.
21 The National Association for Home Care (NAHC) engaged in intense lobbying efforts to
repeal IPS provisions perceived to be adverse to the industry. See, e.g., US Senate Members Press for
IPS Reform, NAHC REP. 780 (Sept. 25, 1998) <http://www.nahc.org/tango/report>. The NAHC also
has filed suit against HCFA, attempting to invalidate as "arbitrary and capricious" agency regulations
interpreting the IPS reimbursement limitations. See NAHC IPS Lawsuit Advances, NAHC REP. 795
(Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www/nahc/orgltango/report>.
22 Industry efforts to obtain relief bore fruit in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West Supp. 1999)). The Act allowed HHAs whose FY 1998 limits were below
the national median to set FY 1999 limits at one-third the difference between the 1998 limits and the
national median. See Appropriations Act § 5101(a)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395x(v)(l)(L) (West Supp. 1999)). The Act also set the per beneficiary limits for "new" agencies at
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difficulties associated with making HCFA's systems Y2K compliant and
the numerous problems encountered by HCFA in formulating the home-
health PPS, Congress also extended the deadline for PPS implementation
to October 2000.23 This delay led some to speculate that the IPS might
remain in place for additional years,2 4 prompting concern as to how the
system should be managed to constrain costs more effectively.
Cost control through beneficiary cost-sharing has been proposed by
both the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and its
predecessor, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission
(ProPAC).25 Legislative initiatives to impose beneficiary copayments on
home health services have been repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) attempted
over the years.26 However, the BBA contemplates the possible introduction
the median of the per beneficiary limits based on 100% of costs, rather than 98%. In addition, the Act
established limits for agencies certified on or after October 1, 1998 at 75% of the limits for "new"
agencies as defined in the BBA. See id. The Act also increased the per visit limits to 106% of the
median cost per visit for cost reporting periods beginning in FY 1999. See id. § 5101(b)(3) (codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(l)(L)(i)(v) (West Supp. 1999)); see also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 92 & nn.8-9 (1999) [hereinafter
1999 MEDPAC REPORT).
23 See Appropriations Act § 5101(c)(l)-(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395fff
(West Supp. 1999)). MedPAC has noted the difficulties experienced thus far in attempting to design a
home-health PPS, remarking that "it has been difficult to design a PPS that appropriately classified
patients who require both short and longer-term home health services." 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra
note 22, at 92. Efforts to render HCFA operations Y2K compliant also contributed to the delay in PPS
implementation. See Telephone Interview with Karen Beebe, Health Care Financing Administration
(Feb. 26, 1999).
The decision to roll back the PPS deadline also effectively circumvented the BBA
"contingency" provision, see supra note 7. The Appropriations Act pushed back the effective date for
this contingency provision to September 30, 2000. See Appropriations Act § 5101 (c)(3) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ff (West Supp. 1999)).
24 Telephone Interview with Michael Kinslow, National Association for Home Care (Feb.
18, 1999). However, HHS Secretary Donna Shalala recently assured Congress that the PPS would be
in place by October 1, 2000. See Shalala Reports Progress on PPS for Home Care, NAHC REP.
(Jan.2, 1999) <http://www.nahc.org/tango/report> [hereinafter Shalala Reports].
25 See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94-95; MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, VOLUME I: RECOMMENDATIONS
92-94 (1998); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, Mar. 1996,
in Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1997 Rates, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,444, 27,667 (1996).
MedPAC has argued, inter alia, for the introduction of copayments as an adjunct to the home health
PPS. See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94.
Established under the BBA, MedPAC is an independent federal body charged with advising
Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. MedPAC was formed out of two previous
organizations, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC) and the Physician Payment
Review Commission (PPRC). See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4022, 111 Stat.
251, 350-55 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 1395b(6) (West Supp. 1999)).
26 See, e.g., American Health Security Act of 1999, H.R. 1200, 106th Cong. § 201(b)(2)
(1999) (applying a 20% coinsurance, subject to exemption or reduction for. low-income beneficiaries,
to home and community-based long-term care services offered under a proposed state-based universal
health insurance program); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, H.R. 2015, 105th Cong. § 5362(a) (requiring
a $5 copayment per visit for Medicare Part B home health services, subject to an annual out-of-pocket
maximum equal to the inpatient hospital deductible); S. 947, 105th Cong. § 5362(a) (1997) (same);
Restructuring a Limited Government Act, H.R. 1923, 104th Cong. § 12,001 (1995) (imposing a
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of beneficiary copayments if actual Medicare home health outlays exceed
estimates for each fiscal year between 1999 and 2002.27 MedPAC argues
that cost-sharing would force beneficiaries to assess more critically their
home health service needs and might help to police fraud by encouraging
beneficiaries to review the number and type of services billed.28 MedPAC
also notes that Medicare home health care and clinical laboratory services
are the "only major Medicare benefits that currently require no cost-
sharing., 29
This Note analyzes the merits and disadvantages of beneficiary cost-
sharing as a means of curbing expenditures in the Medicare home health
program. I first establish a theoretical framework for gauging the
normative acceptability of cost-sharing, premised in part on considerations
of vertical equity. I conclude that beneficiary cost-sharing is an
excessively blunt instrument for achieving cost reductions. Cost-sharing is
likely to deter both medically-necessary and -unnecessary home health
usage. Moreover, cost-sharing unreasonably burdens the most vulnerable
segment of the Medicare population. Although cost-sharing might
conceivably be structured to mitigate this burden, the fiscal savings
achievable through such "watered-down" cost-sharing are not worth the
costs. Finally, I argue that alternative means of reducing home health
expenditures-including measures already in place-should be more than
sufficient to reduce home health care growth to more politically acceptable
copayment based prospectively on 20% of the average of all per visit costs for Medicare home health
services under both Part A and Part B, with an exemption or reduction in cost-sharing for low-income
persons); Long-Term Care Reform and Deficit Reduction Act of 1995, S. 85, 104th Cong. § 202(a)
(imposing a copayment equal to 10% of the prospective average nationwide per visit cost of Medicare
home health services under Parts A and B, subject to exemptions for low-income beneficiaries); Home
and Community-Based Services for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1994, S. 2545, 103d Cong. §
202 (a)(l) (same); Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1994, S. 1743, 103d Cong. § 205
(applying a copayment equivalent to 20% of the average of all prospectively per visit costs to Medicare
home health benefits under Parts A and B, with an exemption for services rendered during the 30 days
following hospital discharge); Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, H.R. 3704, 103d
Cong. § 6136 (same); Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. § 4134 (requiring a copayment equal
to 10% of the average of all prospectively per visit costs for home health services provided under Parts
A and B, unless fumished during the 30 days following hospital discharge); Health Security Act, H.R.
3600, 103d Cong. § 4134 (same).
27 The BBA reads in pertinent part:
Not later than the end of each of years 1999 through 2002, the Secretary shall
submit to [various congressional committees] a report that compares the actual
outlays under such parts for such services during the fiscal year ending the year, to
the outlays estimated ... for such fiscal year. If the Secretary finds that such
actual outlays were greater than such estimated outlays for the fiscal year, the
Secretary shall include in the report recommendations regarding beneficiary
copaymentsfor home health services provided under the medicare [sic] program or
such other methods as will reduce the growth in outlays for home health services
under the medicare [sic] program.
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4616(b), 111 Stat. 251, 475 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y (West Supp. 1999)) (emphasis added).
28 See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94.
29 Id.
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levels.
While many scholars have examined critically the use of cost-sharing
in public health insurance programs,3° including Medicare, 31 no systematic
attempt to assess the implications of cost-sharing for Medicare home
health has yet been undertaken.32 The NAHC has opposed the use of
copayments and other such techniques in home health care,33 while
MedPAC has consistently supported cost-sharing; 34 however, neither
proponents nor detractors of the cost-sharing idea have engaged in a
systematic inquiry into its probable consequences. Indeed, no "natural" or
"true" experiments have been conducted regarding the use of beneficiary
cost-sharing in home health care,35 making any projections regarding the
effects of cost-sharing inevitably somewhat speculative. This Note draws
on existing studies of the effects of cost-sharing in analogous health care
domains and attempts to gauge the likely impact of cost-sharing on cost,
30 See, e.g., GREG L. STODDART ET AL., PREMIER'S COUNCIL ON HEALTH, WELL-BEING
AND SOC. JUSTICE, USER CHARGES, SNARES AND DELUSIONS: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE LITERATURE
(Ont., Can. 1994) (arguing that user charges are detrimental to the achievement of a number of vital
policy objectives); Douglas Conrad & Theodore R. Marmor, Patient Cost-Sharing, in THEODORE R.
MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND AMERICAN MEDICAL CARE 207 (1983) (examining the
appropriate uses and limits of patient cost-sharing); Robert G. Evans & Morris L. Barer, User Feesfor
Health Care: Why a Bad Idea Keeps Coming Back (Or, What's Health Got To Do With It?), 14
CANADIAN J. AGING 360 (1995) (arguing that user fees benefit the healthy and wealthy, while hurting
the aged and vulnerable); Thomas Rice & Kathleen R. Morrison, Patient Cost Sharing for Medical
Services: A Review of the Literature and Implications for Health Care Reform, 51 MED. CARE REV.
235 (1994) (assessing the benefits and disadvantages of cost-sharing in health care and advocating its
use in certain circumstances).
31 See, e.g., GERARD F. ANDERSON ET AL., HEALTH INS. ASS'N AM., CONCERNS ABOUT
THE THEORY OF INCREASED COST-SHARING FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES AND ITS POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEDICARE PROGRAM (1998) (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.hiaa.org>
(criticizing cost-sharing proposals for Medicare); George S. Chulis et al., Why More Cost-Sharing
Won't Slow Medicare Spending, J. AM. HEALTH POL'Y, July-Aug. 1993, at 15 (same).
32 But see GENEVIEVE KENNEY & MARILYN MOON, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, REINING
IN THE GROWTH IN HOME HEALTH SERVICES UNDER MEDICARE vii-viii, 17-22 (1997) (examining
various cost-sharing options for Medicare home health and advocating moderate copayments irr
conjunction with other beneficiary measures); JOEL LEON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
UNDERSTANDING THE GROWTH IN MEDICARE'S HOME HEALTH EXPENDITURES 25-26 (1997) (offering
brief argument against using copayments in the Medicare home health program).
33 See NATIONAL ASS'N FOR HOME CARE, LEGISLATIVE BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION 1999, at
17 (1999) (arguing against the use of copayments in Medicare home health care).
34 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
35 Rice and Morrison distinguish a natural from a true experiment in the following manner:
A natural experiment occurs when there is a change in the variable of interest (in
this case, cost sharing) but nothing else. By examining differences in utilization
before and after the change in cost sharing, one can be fairly confident that the
change in cost sharing caused the changes in service use. A true experimental
design, in which individuals are randomly assigned to different cost-sharing
groups, is considered to be the "gold standard." If sample members accept their
assignment and if there is a sufficient sample size, differences in utilization should
almost certainly be the result of alternative cost-sharing requirements. Such
studies, of course, suffer from one overriding impediment-they can be terribly
expensive to conduct.
Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 237-38.
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usage, provider response, and health-care outcomes. To do this, I examine
the demographics and usage patterns of beneficiaries, as well as provider
characteristics.
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the evolution of the home
health care industry and of Medicare home health coverage. Part II then
sets out the theoretical basis for cost-sharing and the touted benefits of
cost-sharing in home health care, followed by normative standards by
which to assess and design cost-sharing measures. Part III presents a
detailed profile of home health care beneficiaries and providers. Part IV
then attempts to assess the likely implications of cost-sharing for Medicare
home health beneficiaries and to gauge this impact by examining how
home health services compare to other medical services for which some
empirical data regarding price-elasticity is available. At the core of Part IV
is a discussion of the effects on demand of such factors as income, health
status, and supplementary medical insurance ("Medigap policies") on
demand under cost-sharing. Part V then explores the likely efficacy and
normative acceptability of different cost-sharing techniques. Finally, Part
VI examines alternatives to cost-sharing, assessing the nascent potential
for cost-reduction in both existing and alternative measures.
I. MEDICARE AND THE HOME HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: OVERVIEW
A. "Hospitals Without Walls ": The Evolution and Definition of Home
Health Care
Until recently in human history, medical care has been provided
primarily in the home; the rise of institutional care in modem times
prompted a counter-movement to return some forms of care to the home.
In America, the development of home-based care as a viable alternative to
institutional care dates back to the late eighteenth century.36 The Boston
Dispensary, founded in 1796, articulated as its founding principle the goal
that "[t]he sick, without being pained by separation from their families,
may be relieved at home. 37 Proprietary, government, and volunteer
agencies, such as the Visiting Nurses Association (VNA), increasingly
came to recognize the advantage of receiving care without the risks,
complications, and costs of institutionalization. In 1947, Dr. E.M.
Bluestone attracted further interest to this concept of care provision by
founding the first "hospital without walls"-a prototype hospital-based
36 See ALLEN D. SPIEGEL, HOME HEALTH CARE I (2d ed. 1987).
37 Id. (citing T. IRWIN, HOME HEALTH CARE: WHEN A PATIENT LEAVES THE HOSPITAL
(1978)).
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homecare program at Montefiore Hospital in New York City.38 Eventually,
a wide variety of medical services came to be provided in the home,
including occupational and speech therapy, as well as other less obviously
"medical" components of personal care.
"Home health aide" services epitomize the breadth of care that came
to be provided in the home. At the beginning of this century, American
charitable organizations developed a system of "visiting housewives" or
"substitute mothers" to look after children and do household chores for
poor families when the mother was ill. This concept of home-based
personal care gained a significant boost in the 1930s, when the Works
Progress Administration (WPA) employed women as "housekeeping
aides" to attend distressed families. 39 The subsequent growth of such
services in the private, governmental, and volunteer sectors confirmed the
place of "home health aide" services as an adjunct to home-based medical
care.
The definition of "home health care" is complex and problematic,
given the variety of services that have come to be encompassed by the
term. The definition endorsed by four prominent national home health care
organizations is as follows:
Home health service is that component of comprehensive health care
whereby services are provided to individuals and families in their places
of residence for the purpose of promoting, maintaining, or restoring
health or minimizing the effects of illness and disability. Services
appropriate to the needs of the individual patient and family are planned,
coordinated, and made available by an agency or institution, organized
for the delivery of health care through the use of employed staff,
contractual arrangements, or a combination of administrative patterns.
40
The definition of "home health services" under the Medicare statute,
however, captures more of the complexity of the services provided by the
industry:
The term "home health services" means the following items and services
furnished to an individual, who is under the care of a physician, by a
home health agency or by others under arrangements with them made by
38 See id.at 3.
39 Id. at 6-7.
40 Janna Dieckmann, Home Health Administration: An Overview, in HANDBOOK OF HOME
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 3, 3-4 (Marilyn D. Harris ed., 2d ed. 1997). This definition is
endorsed by the Council of Home Health Agencies and Community Health Services of the National
League for Nursing; the National Home Caring Council; the National Association for Home Health
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such agency, under a plan (for furnishing such items and services to such
individual) established and periodically reviewed by a physician, which
items and services are . . . provided on a visiting basis in a place of
residence used as such individual's home.
41
The Medicare statute goes on to list the covered services: "part-time" or
"intermittent" nursing care, physical or occupational therapy and speech-
language pathology services, medical social services, part time or
intermittent home health aide services, and medical supplies.42  The
Medicaid statute, which also covers home health care, uses in effect a
similar definition.43 For the purposes of this paper, I will frequently
differentiate among the various categories of services provided in the
home; however, any general references to "home health care" are intended
to encompass the Medicare definition of "home health services.""
Medicare currently provides the services outlined above to
individuals meeting certain eligibility requirements. First, a physician must
sign and periodically review a plan of care for the beneficiary
contemplating home health services.45  Second, the patient must be
homebound, or "confined to his home.' 46 (Although the statute currently
41 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (1994). Under certain conditions, Medicare coverage also extends
to services otherwise covered yet provided on an outpatient basis, under arrangements made by the
home health agency, at a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or rehabilitation center. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395x(m)(7).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m)(l )-(7). "Part time or intermittent" is defined by the statute as:
[Slkilled nursing and home health aide services furnished any number of days per
week as long as they are furnished (combined) less than 8 hours each day and 28
or fewer hours each week (or, subject to review on a case-by-case basis as to the
need for care, less than 8 hours each day and 35 or fewer hours per week).
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m).
43 The Medicaid program was established under Title XIX of the Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 370 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396s (1994)). Further elaboration of the Medicaid statute is provided at 42 C.F.R. §§ 430-56 (1998).
The Medicaid statute contemplates home health services under three general statutory
provisions. For qualifying elderly, the Medicaid statute first provides for "home health care services,"
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(7) (1994), which are defined by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) as including nursing services; home health aide services; medical supplies and
equipment for the home; physical and occupational therapy; and speech pathology and audiology
services. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70 (1998). Second, the Medicaid statute also covers "private duty
nursing services," 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(8), which HHS has defined as "nursing services for
recipients who require more individual and continuous care than is available from a visiting nurse or
routinely provided by the nursing staff of the hospital or skilled nursing facility." 42 C.F.R. § 440.80.
Private duty nursing may be provided either in the home, in a hospital, or at an SNF. See 42 C.F.R. §
440.80(c). Third, for the "functionally disabled elderly," Medicaid allows an expansive array of
possible services provided in the home under the rubric of "home and community care." 42 U.S.C. §
1396t(a). The services falling under this heading include such benefits as chore services, training for
family members caring for the beneficiary, respite care, and adult day care. See id.
44 Note that this definition leaves out hospice care, which is treated separately under the
Medicare statute. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(m) (West Supp. 1999). No one has seriously argued that
hospice care should be subjected to cost-sharing, even though it is administered in the home.
45 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395f(a)(2), 1395n(a)(2), 1395x(m) (West Supp. 1999).
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(a)(2)(c).
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provides some guidance as to the meaning of this phrase,47 the BBA
requires the HHS Secretary to conduct a study for the purpose of
elaborating this definition.48 ) Third, the patient must require one of the
services falling under the definition of "home health services" above,49 and
receive service from a Medicare-certified provider.50
Moreover, the BBA enacted measures designed to increasingly
transfer home health costs from Part A to Part B.51 The BBA stipulates that
individuals with both Part A and Part B coverage can receive Part A home
health services for only 100 visits per spell of illness, and only where
services are provided within fourteen days of a three-day prior hospital
stay or of a visit of any duration to an SNF. 2 All other coverage for such
individuals falls under Part B.53 This transition is intended to reduce
overall Medicare expenditures by shifting more home health costs to
54beneficiaries through the annual Part B premium.
47 The current definition is the following:
[A]n individual shall be considered to be "confined to his home" if the individual
has a condition, due to an illness or injury, that restricts the ability of the
individual to leave his or her home except with the assistance of another individual
or the aid of a supportive device ... or if the individual has a condition such that
leaving his or her home is medically contraindicated. While an individual does not
have to be bedridden . .. the condition of the individual should be such that there
exists a normal inability to leave home, that leaving home requires considerable
and taxing effort by the individual, and that absences of the individual from home
are infrequent or of relatively short duration, or are attributable to the need to
receive medical treatment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(a) (West Supp. 1999).
48 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4613, 111 Stat. 251, 474
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x (West Supp. 1999)).
49 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. The BBA stipulated that, if an individual
requires venipuncture alone, home health administration of this service is not covered under Medicare.
See Balanced Budget Act § 4615 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395n(a)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1999)).
50 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(o).
51 See Balanced Budget Act § 461 l(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d
(West Supp. 1999)). Medicare "Part A" provides mandatory coverage for inpatient hospital care,
inpatient care in a SNF, home health care, and hospice care. In contrast, Medicare Part B is optional,
and beneficiaries are required to pay an annual premium. Part B coverage includes medical care and
services provided by physicians and other medical practitioners, durable medical equipment, a variety
of outpatient care services, and home health care services not covered under Part A. See CENTER FOR
MEDICARE ADVOCACY, INC., AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICARE COVERAGE AND APPEALS 11-19
(1998) [hereinafter MEDICARE COVERAGE AND APPEALS].
52 See Balanced Budget Act § 4611 (a)-(b); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x. Such coverage is
referred to as "post-institutional home health services." See Balanced Budget Act § 4611 (a)-(b).
53 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d. For individuals with only Part A coverage, there are no such
restrictions on coverage; Part A covers all relevant services. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d(a)(3).
54 The BBA contemplates adjusting the Part B premiums in concert with the home health
transition from Part A to Part B. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4611(1)(3),
I1l Stat. 251, 473 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 1395d (West Supp. 1999)).
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B. Medicare Home Health: Origins and Evolution
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 heralded the
beginning of federal funding for home health care.55' Although the
Medicare statute provided little coverage initially, subsequent legislation
broadened access and encouraged the development of a sizeable provider
network.56 Originally conceived as a short-term, post-acute initiative, the
Medicare home health program was intended primarily to help
beneficiaries recover after hospital stays. As such, the program was
originally covered under Part A, with no cost-sharing. However,
beneficiaries could also receive Part B coverage (subject to coinsurance)
without a prior hospital stay after Part A benefits were exhausted.
Although the 1972 repeal of the Part B cost-sharing requirement and other
measures contributed to a slight growth in program outlays during the
early 1970s, 57 Medicare home health expenditures under Parts A and B
remained quite modest until the 1980s (see Appendix, Figure 1).
A series of legislative, judicial, and administrative actions in the
1980s ultimately paved the way for the rapid growth of Medicare home
health costs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, the passage of the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 198058 abolished the three-day
hospitalization requirement that had previously attached to benefits, as
well as the 100-visit limit and $100 deductible.5 9 Perhaps most
significantly, the Act permitted for-profit (proprietary) home health
agencies to become Medicare-certified providers.6 ° In addition, the 1983
enactment of the Medicare Prospective Payment System for inpatient
hospital care,6' which reduced the average length of hospital stays,
increased home health usage. Under the Act, hospitals faced incentives to
55 The Medicare program is set forth in Title XVIII of the Social Security Amendments of
1965. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, Title XVIII, 79 Stat. 286, 291-343
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-73, 79 Stat. 218. This paper focuses on the Medicare home health program, referring where
appropriate to coverage under Medicaid. However, federal home health coverage is also available
through the Administration on Aging, which provides in-home benefits to qualifying beneficiaries. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 3030d, 3030h-m, 3030p (1994). State-funded programs, such as Indiana's In-
Home/CHOICE program, also provide coverage. See William Styring III & Thomas J. Duesterberg,
The Cost Effectiveness of Home Health Care: A Case Study of Indiana 's In-Home/CHOICE Program,
OUTLOOK: IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE FROM HUDSON INSTITUTE, Nov. 1997, at 3.
56 See SPIEGEL, supra note 36, at 5.
57 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
58 Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599.
59 Id. § 930(g), (h)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k, 13951(1994)).
60 Id. § 930(n)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(o)).Throughout the 1970s,
public, voluntary, and nonprofit agencies had dominated the home health market, largely due to
Medicare provisions disallo'wing certification of proprietary agencies. See LEON ET AL., supra note 32,
at 6.
61 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, Title VI, 97 Stat. 65, 149-
72 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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discharge Medicare patients earlier in the recovery period and to substitute
home health and other post-acute services for hospital care. 62 Financial
pressures associated with the hospital PPS also may have prompted
hospitals to generate revenue by establishing and referring patients to
hospital-owned home health agencies.63
The resulting spike in Medicare home health outlays prompted HCFA
to restrict access through a series of instructions to Medicare fiscal
intermediaries. 64 As a consequence, program expenditures declined
between 1984 and 1988, while the number of retrospective denials of
payments to home health agencies rose significantly. 65 HCFA's restrictive
interpretation of home health coverage provoked the landmark 1988 class-
66action suit Duggan v. Bowen. As a result of the ruling in that case, HCFA
revised the Home Health Agency Manual (HIM-1 1)67 and the Medicare
Intermediary Manual (HIM- 13)68 to express a more expansive
interpretation of Medicare home health coverage.69 Moreover, budget
reductions and reduced regulatory oversight due to changes to HIM-13
also appear to have yielded increased home health spending.70 The
cumulative effect of these judicial, legislative, and administrative actions
undoubtedly generated much of the home health expansion in the late
62 See GAO, GAO/PEMD-85-8, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EVALUATING THE
IMPACTS OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON POST-HOSPITAL LONG-TERM-CARE SERVICES:
PRELIMINARY REPORT 2 (1985); LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 7.
63 See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 9 (1996); Komisar & Feder, supra note 18, at 9.
64 These included restricting home health services to individuals who were "homebound"
and required "part-time" and "intermittent" care. See GAO, GAO/HEHS-96-16, MEDICARE: HOME
HEALTH UTILIZATION EXPANDS WHILE PROGRAM CONTROLS DETERIORATE 5-7 (1996) [hereinafter
GAO HOME HEALTH]. For a complete discussion of these and other instructions restricting access, see
id.
65 See GAO, GAO/HRD-90-14BR, MEDICARE: INCREASED DENIALS OF HOME HEALTH
CLAIMS DURING 1986 AND 1987, at 8 (1990); LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 8.
66 691 F. Supp. 1487 (D.D.C. 1988).
67 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE HOME
HEALTH AGENCY MANUAL (Transmittal No. 222, 1989).
68 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE, PART A,
INTERMEDIARY MANUAL (1989).
69 Beneficiaries now only had to require "part-time" or "intermittent" care. The definition
of "homebound" was clarified, and HCFA's clinical criteria governing home health coverage were
relaxed. See GAO HOME HEALTH, supra note 64, at 5-7; KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 3-5;
LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 8. For a good summary of these regulatory changes, see Komisar &
Feder, supra note 18, at 5-6.
70 The HIM-13 changes made it more difficult for Medicare intermediaries to deny home
health claims. Whereas before the 1989 changes, denials could be made solely on the basis of the
reviewer's general inferences about patients with similar diagnoses or on general utilization data, the
revised HIM-13 required that the need for care be evaluated based on a review of the patient's medical
condition. This change made claims review (and, therefore, denials) more costly for intermediaries,
reducing the number of denials. See Komisar & Feder, supra note 18, at 6-7. Furthermore, substantial
reductions in Medicare's funding for contractor medical reviews resulted in a decline in the proportion
of claims to be reviewed. These funding cuts also prompted Medicare in 1995 to "drop [] a
requirement that audits of home health agencies include visiting beneficiaries' homes." Id. at 7.
150
The Price of Reform
1980s and early 1990s.
However, other factors also may have played a role in encouraging
the recent home health boom. One lingering "structural" problem facing
the Medicare home health program is the cost-based reimbursement
system, which provides little incentive for agencies to deliver an efficient
amount or mix of home health services. 71 Second, "the ease of obtaining
and keeping Medicare certification," particularly for proprietary HHAs,
"may have contributed to" the supply-side increase.72 Third, technological
developments have allowed an increasing number of medical services to
be supplied in the home, generating increasing demand for complex
outpatient regimes.73 Fourth, many states have adopted "maximization"
strategies which take advantage of the liberalized Medicare home health
guidelines to leverage Medicare funds for beneficiaries who are "dual
eligibles" (i.e., eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid).74 Fifth, fraud and
abuse by providers have undoubtedly contributed to the rise in program
expenditures. 75 Finally, some have speculated that many physicians have,
by simply signing the required form, effectively delegated their authority
to prescribe home health care to nurses affiliated with HHAs, who have an
incentive to encourage over-utilization.76
Regardless of the factors that ultimately precipitated the increase, the
Medicare home health program experienced a broad and dramatic
expansion during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Expenditures rose from
$3.7 billion in 1990 to $12.7 billion in 1994 (an average annual increase of
36%), increasing from 4.8% to 8.6% of total Medicare spending.77
However, the average charge per visit exhibited only a moderate increase,
rising from $62 in 1988 to $84 in 1995.78 The cumulative effect on
71 The home health benefit is one of the few remaining Medicare programs that reimburses
providers on the basis of cost. Under this system, "since an agency's payment limit increase[s] with the
number of visits [] delivered, it ha[s] no reason to curb volume as long as the average cost per visit
d[oes] not exceed the average limit.... Because the limits were based on national averages, [HHAs
have a further] incentive to provide numerous, relatively low-cost visits within each visit type." Id. at
7-8.
72 Id. at 8. ("Medicare certifies nearly all [HHAs] that apply, and agencies generally retain
their certification, even after being repeatedly cited for substandard care."); see also GAO, GAO/T-
HEHS-97-180, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH AGENCIES: CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS INEFFECTIVE IN
EXCLUDING PROBLEM AGENCIES (1997) [hereinafter GAO CERTIFICATION].
73 See IMPACT OF INTERIM PAYMENT, supra note 11, at 4; see also Welch et aL., supra note
7, at 329.
74 See IMPACT OF INTERIM PAYMENT, supra note 11, at 4. This GAO study provides as an
example "Minnesota's Medicare Maximization Initiative, a program designed to teach providers how
to use Medicare for home health services, supplies, and equipment for [dual eligibles]." Id. at 4 n.6.
75 See id. at 4; see also supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
76 See Welch et al., supra note 7, at 328-29.
77 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 9.
78 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 6 tbl.l. Based on 1989-1991 data, Bishop and
Skwara conclude that per visit charge increases are not the cause of Medicare home health spending
growth during that period. Christine Bishop & Kathleen Carley Skwara, Recent Growth of Medicare
Home Health, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1993, at 100-01.
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expenditures of the changes initiated in the 1980s is depicted in Figures 1
and 2.
In addition, the years since the changes in Medicare home health
policy have witnessed a transformation in the number and type of visits
sought by beneficiaries, as well as in the number of Medicare beneficiaries
taking advantage of the home health benefit. The number of Medicare
home health beneficiaries rose from approximately 1.7 million in 1989 to
2.8 million in 1993, a 65% increase. 79 The average number of visits per
beneficiary also increased from 26.49 in 1989 to 56.71 in 1993.80 The mix
of services provided during these visits shifted toward the less-skilled
services provided by home health aides. Whereas 33.8% of all services
were provided by home health aides in 1988, that figure rose to 48.7% by
1995. t Moreover, the preceding trends exhibit significant geographic
variation, with southern states yielding in 1996 "the highest number of
persons served per 1000 enrollees (121), the highest number of visits per
1000 enrollees (11,881), and the highest number of visits per person
served (98).,,12 Proprietary agencies consistently provided more visits in all
83regions.
The home health industry has grown considerably over the same
period. For example, the number of Medicare-certified HHAs climbed
from 5785 in 1988 to 9120 in 1995-an increase of 58%. Growth in the
number of proprietary agencies, which had already risen dramatically in
the wake of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980,84 fuelled much of
this supply-side expansion. The proprietary sector grew from 35.26% of all
HHAs in 1989 to 48.5 1% in 1994.85 Figure 3 illustrates the transformation
of the home health industry since 1980.
More fundamentally, the program has moved beyond its previous
short-term, post-acute focus to encompass long-term, chronic care." For
79 See GAO HOME HEALTH, supra note 64, at 32-33.
80 See id. at 36.
81 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 7.
82 Health Care Fin. Admin., Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement. 1998, HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV., at 88 [hereinafter Medicare-Medicaid Supplement]. For analysis of the causes of this
geographic variation, see KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 8-12; JOSHUA M. WIENER & DAVID G.
STEVENSON, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY: PROFILES OF THIRTEEN STATES (The Urban
Institute, Occasional Paper No. 12, 1998); Elizabeth Mauser & Nancy A. Miller, A Profile of Home
Health Users in 1992, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1994, at 17; and Jennifer Schore, Regional
Variation in Medicare Home Health: Taking a Closer Look (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http://www.mathematica-mpr.community/HHVEXE.htm>.
83 See GAO HOME HEALTH, supra note 64, at 12-13.
84 Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of proprietary
agencies increased from 186 to 1943 (a 945% increase). See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 10.'
85 See GAO HOME HEALTH, supra note 64, at 34.
86 This transformation has been widely noted in the home health literature. See, e.g.,
KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 13; Bishop & Skwara, supra note 78; Welch et al., supra note 7,
at 328. Of course, the burden of caring for the chronically ill also undoubtedly bears a causal
relationship to the rise in program expenditures by exacerbating home health costs.
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example, one 1996 study revealed that 61% of home health visits in a
given sample were to enrollees receiving six or more months of home
health care, whereas only 4% received care for a month or less.87 Indeed,
chronic conditions, such as diabetes mellitus and cardiovascular disorders,
constitute the majority of diagnoses in which home health care is
employed.88 Figure 4 displays the six most prevalent diagnoses for home
health care usage. A recent study by the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF)
further noted that in 1994 some 33% of all home health users explicitly
relied on Medicare for their long-term care needs.89 This transformation of
the Medicare home health benefit into an instrument of long-term care
arguably fills a vital need, given the virtual absence of a coherent U.S.
long-term care policy.9 ° However, the financial burden associated with
using home health care for chronic conditions is substantial. In 1994, the
10% of home health care users receiving 200 or more visits per year
accounted for 43% of total home health expenditures. 9'
Thus, despite a recent moderation in the growth of the Medicare
home health program,92 the adoption of more stringent anti-fraud
measures, and the implementation of the IPS, many believe that the
program has either already exceeded acceptable bounds or has the
potential for additional, uncontrollable growth.93 These concerns have
prompted the many recent calls for beneficiary cost-sharing, a problem to
which I now turn.
87 See Welch et al., supra note 7, at 326.
88 See id. HCFA has noted that the leading three diagnoses cited in 1996 for home health
use were diabetes mellitus, which accounted for 7.1% of all persons using HHA services, heart failure,
and essential hypertension (the latter two together accounted for 11.3% of all persons). The next three
most prevalent diagnoses were osteoarthrosis, cerebrovascular disease, and chronic airway obstruction.
Together, these 6 leading conditions accounted for approximately 30% of all persons served and 35%
of all program payments. See Medicare-Medicaid Supplement, supra note 82, at 92-93.
89 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 18-19.
90 See WEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-2 ("The United States does not have, either in the
private or public sector, satisfactory mechanisms for helping people anticipate and pay for long-term
care.").
91 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at 19.
92 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Welch et al., supra note 7, at 328 ("Pressures on providers and patients are
likely to result in further increases in the use of home health care in the future."). In contrast to many
such predictions, HCFA's Office of the Actuary estimated that Medicare home health expenditures in
the wake of the BBA would increase between FY 1997 and FY 2002 at an annual average rate of only
0.09%. See MEDICARE PROFILE, supra note 1, at 41.
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II. Cost-sharing and Home Health Care: A Theoretical Framework
A. The Theoretical Basis for Beneficiary Cost-sharing
The argument for cost-sharing is premised on neoclassical economic
theory applied to patient demand for medical services. Patient demand can
be expressed by a demand curve wherein quantity demanded (Q) varies
with price (P); the nature of this relationship--i.e., the responsiveness of Q
to P-is expressed as the elasticity of demand. The demand curve is
typically an expression of a number of underlying factors, including
income, "taste" (e.g., consumer perception of health services quality or
consumer preference for more or less medical attention), and the price of
other related commodities (i.e., either complements or substitutes).94
Health insurance, such as Medicare, lowers the effective price borne by
recipients, shifting the demand curve upwards. Holding all other factors
constant, cost-sharing moderates the differential between Q before and
after insurance, thereby mitigating moral hazard (see Appendix, Figure
5)
9 5
Three principal cost-sharing arrangements have been developed for
both private and public insurance programs: deductibles, copayments, and
coinsurance. A deductible requires that the patient pay all costs up to a
specified maximum (e.g., the first $100 of prescription drug charges). A
copayment requires that the patient pay a fixed charge per unit of medical
services consumed (e.g., a $10 charge for every physician visit).
Coinsurance entails the payment of some fixed percentage of a medical
bill. Patient liability under any of these cost-sharing techniques or a
combination thereof can be limited through the out-of-pocket maximum,
wherein the patient is only responsible for cost-sharing up to a fixed total
amount (for example, $500 per year); this limit may also be expressed as a
percentage of income. Whether singly or in combination, these measures
are expected to reduce the quantity of medical services demanded, albeit in
94 This model of patient demand, insurance, and cost-sharing is outlined in PHILIP JACOBS,
THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 65-114 (3d ed. 1991). See also KENNETH J. ARROW,
OFFICE OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, R-I 10800E0, OPTIMAL INSURANCE AND GENERALIZED
DEDUCTIBLES (1973); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963). Of course, neoclassical economic theory is much more complicated than
the simple model given here, involving, inter alia, the construction of a utility function and the
consideration of numerous additional variables. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra, at 91-114; Mark V. Pauly, Is
Medical Care Different? Old Questions. New Answers, J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW, Summer 1998,
at 227. For a more general discussion of the principles of insurance and risk, see CAROL A. HEIMER,
REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION (1985); and ALLAN H. WILLETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
RISK AND INSURANCE (1901).
95 See JACOBS, supra note 94, at 81-86.
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different ways and with differing degrees of effectiveness.96
Numerous policy objectives have been adduced in support of
beneficiary cost-sharing under public insurance regimes. First, cost-
sharing is often held up as a means to make beneficiaries more cost-
conscious, thereby encouraging them to reduce "unnecessary" use of
medical services and to find less costly alternatives. Second, by
encouraging beneficiaries to assess more scrupulously whether a given
service is medically necessary, cost-sharing allegedly enables a more
effective "policing" of providers, helping to stem fraud and abuse. The
ultimate objective of this enhanced beneficiary attention to cost is to
reduce the burden that the program in question exerts on the public fisc.
By reducing this fiscal burden, cost-sharing allows the government to
provide broader coverage than would otherwise be possible.97 Finally,
cost-sharing proposals are frequently infused with the normative objective
of making beneficiaries share part of the burden of care and take some
responsibility for their health.9
B. Medicare Home Health and Cost-sharing: A Framework for
Acceptability
Is Medicare home health a viable candidate for cost-sharing?
Proponents of cost-sharing have identified at least three of the benefits
enumerated above: cost-sharing would (1) reduce the growing fiscal
burden associated with the Medicare home health program, (2) reduce
patient demand for "unnecessary" care, and (3) facilitate patient
monitoring of provider recommendations for care. 99 In addition, many
have noted the fact that home health provision is, along with clinical
laboratory services, one of the only two Medicare-covered services exempt
from cost-sharing. Thus, a kind of "fairness" or program-consistency
argument is often made in support of cost-sharing.'00 The idea that all
96 Note that Q is predicted to drop from the pre-cost-sharing level for two reasons: First,
when the price of medical care services rises, individuals will substitute other services whose prices
have not risen as quickly. Second, rising medical care services will reduce the income available to
purchase all goods and services, including medical care. See Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 276
n.I.
97 These two objectives are articulated in Conrad & Marmor, supra note 30, at 209-11.
98 For a discussion of these normative arguments, see GREG L. STODDART ET AL.,
PREMIER'S COUNCIL ON HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND SOC. JUSTICE, WHY NOT USER CHARGES? THE
REAL ISSUES 8-10 (1993) (Ont., Can.). See also David Frum, User Fees Teach Civil Responsibility,
FIN. POST, May 15, 1993, at S2.
99 See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94 (arguing that cost-sharing would reduce
program costs by requiring beneficiaries to assess more carefully the necessity of home health services,
thereby deterring unnecessary use and facilitating beneficiary policing of provider recommendations);
KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 18 (noting that cost-sharing could reduce the fiscal burden
associated with Medicare home health, particularly by discouraging unnecessary use).
100 See, e.g., 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94.
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beneficiaries must shoulder responsibility for their health care (the
"responsibility argument" noted above) implicitly informs the "fairness"
argument.
Three of the four objectives outlined above have clear normative
appeal. Reduction of the fiscal burden associated with Medicare either
frees up public resources for other government initiatives or paves the way
for tax reductions. Moreover, curbing abuse and unnecessary medical
services-whether patient- or provider-driven-assures that resources are
used effectively and go to recipients who actually need them.'0 ' However,
the program consistency argument seems doubtful. Not only could it be
argued that cost-sharing under Medicare is already too pervasive and
burdensome, 10 2  but one might reasonably conclude that there are
prudential and other grounds upon which to base the home health
exemption (a matter which I address in subsequent Parts). The aesthetic
appeal of uniformity is not a sufficiently compelling basis for cost-sharing.
Moreover, the "responsibility" argument ignores the fact that home health
services only comprise a fraction of the significant health costs borne by
elderly Medicare beneficiaries. 10 3 Medicare home health beneficiaries are
hardly receiving a "free ride" for their health care, and arguably contribute
to any benefits they receive through social security and other taxes paid
over the course of their lifetimes. The "responsibility" notion may also be
inapt if one adopts the view that beneficiaries have a "right to health
101 For discussion of the philosophical and sociological issues presented by allocative
decisions in medicine, see ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE (1988); Peter Conrad & Phil
Brown, Rationing Medical Care: A Sociological Reflection, 10 RES. Soc. HEALTH CARE 3 (1993); and
Susan D. Goold, Allocating Health Care: Cost-Utility Analysis, Informed Democratic Decision-
Making, or the Veil ofIgnorance?, J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW, Spring 1996, at 69. For further
examination of the concept of "unnecessary" care, see infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
102 Beneficiaries currently face a Part A deductible of $768 for hospital visits, with a
copayment of $192/day for hospital care after the 60th day. This copayment increases to $384/day for
the 91st through 150th days, after which no additional copayment is paid by the beneficiary. Although
there is no deductible for SNF visits, copayment charges of $96/day apply for every day after the 20th
day enrolled (copayment requirements terminate after the 100th day). The annual Part B premium is
$546, with a $100 deductible. Copayments for hospital and SNF stays, in particular, have been singled
out for criticism as being unreasonably high and unduly burdensome. See MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE
NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 147 (2d ed. 1996).
HCFA estimates that in 1996, 30.2 million Medicare beneficiaries incurred a total cost-sharing
liability of $26.8 billion, with an average of $887 per person served. See Medicare-Medicaid
Supplement, supra note 82, at 54. Kenney and Moon estimate the cost-sharing burden for Medicare
home health users in 1996 to be much higher ($2473 per beneficiary). See KENNEY & MOON, supra
note 32, at 19 tbl.5.
The United States is unusual among developed countries in employing widespread cost-sharing.
According to Glaser, European countries tend not to employ much cost-sharing because their
"programs were designed to encourage, not discourage, use." William A. Glaser, Financial Decisions
in European Health Insurance: Lessons for the United States X-15 to X-16 (July 1988) (unpublished
manuscript, New School for Social Research, Graduate School of Management and Urban Professions,
on file with the author).




The Price of Reform
care. , 1 4
In addition to the three goals advocated in preceding paragraphs-
reducing the burden on the public fisc, curbing unnecessary usage, and
reducing fraud-I would argue that a broadly-defined understanding of
"vertical equity" should inform cost-sharing design. Although the concept
of "vertical equity" is most frequently articulated in discussions of tax
incidence, the notion can be expressed more broadly: a person who is
better off (in terms of income, health, and resources) should bear a greater
proportion of the burden associated with a given public policy than one
who is less well off.105
This conception of relative welfare is targeted toward the protection
of comparatively vulnerable beneficiaries. For present purposes,
"vulnerability" is measured primarily along two axes: income and health
status. Thus, cost-sharing measures must attempt to be as "income-
progressive" as possible. Indeed, unless it is expressly linked to income,
cost-sharing can be highly regressive. 10 6 A $500 deductible, for example,
is considerably more burdensome for a beneficiary with an annual income
of $10,000 than for a recipient earning $100,000 a year. Indeed, none of
the existing Medicare cost-sharing provisions requires an assessment of
income. Income progressivity should shape judgments as to which
beneficiary cohorts should bear cost-sharing burdens and to what extent.
Moreover, vertical equity should apply according to health status: cost-
sharing should not unduly burden the sickest and most physically
vulnerable beneficiaries. 10 7 However, the concept of "vulnerability" is
susceptible to a broader definition where appropriate, encompassing such
criteria as a beneficiary's ability to access health care and his capacity to
104 For an assessment of the philosophical underpinnings of this idea, see generally CHARLES
J. DOUGHERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS, AND REFORMS (1988).
105 For a discussion of the concept of vertical equity, see J. RONNIE DAVIS & CHARLES W.
MEYER, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 120-21 (1983); and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 400-01 (2d ed. 1988). In contrast, horizontal equity implies that those of similar means
are treated similarly. As Richard Musgrave notes, "[tlhe requirements of horizontal and vertical equity
are but different sides of the same coin." RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE:
A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 160 (1959). Note that the interpretation of vertical equity applied in this
paper implicitly rejects the adoption of one proposed method of equitable taxation: i.e., requiring that
the burden be applied in proportion to the benefits one receives from a given program. Cf WIENER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 167-68 (rejecting the imposition of taxes to pay for a long-term care program by
placing the tax burden on those who benefit from such a program). For an example of the application
of vertical equity to health policy, see Gavin Mooney, And Now for Vertical Equity? Some Concerns
Arising from Aboriginal Health in Australia, 5 HEALTH ECON. 99 (1996).
106 This fact has been widely noted. See, e.g., Thomas Rice & Kenneth E. Thorpe, Income-
Related Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993, at 21, 22.
107 Poor health status correlates with low income. See Rice & Thorpe, supra note 106, at 23
("In 1990, for example, 19 percent of persons with incomes less than $14,000 rated their health as
'fair' or 'poor,' compared with 5 percent or less among those with incomes above $35,000.") (citation
omitted). Thus, the requirement that cost-sharing be progressive regarding one index of welfare (i.e.,
health status) necessitates consideration of the other (i.e., income). For a discussion of "vulnerable
populations" for health care purposes, see Lu ANN ADAY, AT RISK IN AMERICA 1-14 (1993).
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draw upon "informal health care," such as that provided by family
members.
In addition to vertical equity considerations, which are predominantly
concerned with relative welfare, cost-sharing proposals must be
circumscribed by basic criteria of absolute welfare. Cost-sharing must not
unduly burden beneficiaries according to either income or health status.
Thus, no beneficiary should be forced into poverty or onto the Medicaid
rolls as a consequence of cost-sharing. Nor should cost-sharing force
beneficiaries to avoid needed care, thereby fundamentally compromising
their health status. These requirements place a normative "floor" below
which cost-sharing should not force beneficiaries.1
08
To summarize, a normatively-acceptable cost-sharing strategy is
conceivable: cost-sharing may be designed to ease the burden of a public
program on the public fisc by reducing unnecessary usage and targeting
fraud. However, vertical equity requires that such a policy distribute the
burdens of cost-sharing so as to minimize the burden on the most
vulnerable populations (measured in terms of income, health status, and
access to resources). Moreover, cost-sharing should not cause members of
a given population to experience an unreasonably low level of income or
health status.
Would cost-sharing under Medicare home health meet the preceding
criteria? Obviously, a great deal depends on the specific manner in which a
cost-sharing regime is designed. For example, a requirement that
beneficiaries bear a 50% coinsurance burden would be prima facie
unacceptable, whereas a $3 copayment per home health visit might present
a more seemingly plausible scenario. However, to generate meaningful
predictions as to how beneficiaries will respond to any form of cost-
sharing, we must first develop a more comprehensive sense of beneficiary
characteristics.
III. Beneficiary Profile
A. Demographic Characteristics and Health Indicators
A recent Kaiser Family Foundation study'09 reveals that Medicare
home health beneficiaries constitute some of the most vulnerable members
108 This conception of absolute welfare arguably possesses the same normative roots as the
related concern for relative welfare (vertical equity). In addition to their intuitive normative appeal,
both conceptions arguably resonate with the contractarian distributive justice theories propounded by
such theorists as John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8-9 (rev. ed. 1999). For a
communitarian perspective on vertical equity, see Gavin Mooney & Stephen Jan, Vertical Equity:
Weighting Outcomes? Or Establishing Procedures?, 39 HEALTH POL'Y 79 (1997).
109 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32.
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of the Medicare population. As Figure 6 indicates, 24.8% of beneficiaries
in 1994 were eighty-five or older (compared to 9.6% of the general
Medicare population). Moreover, home health recipients were more likely
to be female (67.7%) and African-American (11.9%) than other Medicare
recipients. These demographic characteristics have exhibited a historical
tendency to correlate with lower income and health characteristics."t 0
Indeed, the KFF study affirms that 68.7% of Medicare home health users
have incomes below $15,000. It is therefore not surprising that 23.8% of
beneficiaries also receive Medicaid.111
Medicare home health beneficiaries are also in worse health than the
general Medicare population, while possessing fewer family resources to
help them meet the needs of their illnesses. 57.8% of home health users
rated their health status as either fair or poor, compared to 26.4% for the
rest of the Medicare population.' 2 Moreover, 73% of home health users
had one or more limitations on activities of daily living (ADL), and 47%
had three or more limitations (compared to 11.8% of the general Medicare
population)." 3 Unsurprisingly, Medicare beneficiaries who receive home
health services were more likely to use the health care system generally,
incurring Medicare costs that (on average) were more than five times
greater than Medicare costs for beneficiaries who did not receive home
health care. 1 4 Moreover, 32.5% of home health beneficiaries lived
alone--compared to 25.1% of the entire Medicare population "15 -and,
therefore, without the informal care provided by a live-in spouse or
relative."16 Informal care constitutes a vital source of support for the
110 For a discussion of social inequalities in health status, including the influence of sex,
race, and other characteristics, see Michael Marmot et al., Explanations for Social Inequalities in
Health, in SOCIETY AND HEALTH 172 (Benjamin C. Amick Ill et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter SOCIETY
AND HEALTH]; and Gregory Pappas et al., The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between
Socioeconomic Groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (1993). See
also Gary King & David R. Williams, Race and Health: A Multidimensional Approach to African-
American Health, in SOCIETY AND HEALTH, supra, at 93 (assessing issues facing the health status of
African-Americans); Mark Schlesinger, Paying the Price: Medical Care, Minorities, and the Newly
Competitive Health Care System, 65 MILBANK Q. 270, 275-78 (1987) (describing the generally lower
incomes of African-Americans and their diminished access to health care services).
111 The figures in this paragraph are all taken from the KFF study. See LEON ET AL., supra
note 32, at 15-16.
112 See id.
113 See id. These figures are understandable in light of the fact that, to be eligible for home
health benefits, a Medicare recipient must be so limited in his faculties as to be "confined to his home."
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a)(8), 1395n(a)(2) (1994).
114 SeeLEONETAL.,supranote32, at 16.
115 Seeid. at 15-16.
116 One study of Medicare patients discharged from the hospital indicated that approximately
one-third of caregivers were spouses, whereas one-half were adult children. See Rosalie A. Kane &
Joan Dobrof Penrod, Family Caregiving Policies: Insights from an Intensive Longitudinal Study, in
CAREGIVING SYSTEMS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL HELPERS 273, 281-82 (Steven H. Zarit et al. eds.,
1993) (detailing the results of the Heinz caregiver study). Approximately 13% of the caregivers in the
Heinz study were living with the patient six weeks after hospitalization. See id. at 28 1. These statistics,
however, only track caregiving following hospital discharge, not over the longer term. Of course, the
159
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impaired elderly population, 60-90% of whose care is given by unpaid
relatives and friends."
17
B. Distribution of Medicare Home Health Expenditures and Usage
As the KFF study reveals, Medicare home health beneficiaries
include a sizable chronic, long-term care cohort. In addition to the 34% of
users employing home health services in a "post-acute" capacity, the study
noted that 33% of users required "long-term care," wherein only home
health care was used (i.e., with no recourse to SNF or hospital care)."
8
This category of users employed significantly higher proportions of home
health aide visits than the average home health user, and comprised 35%
of total home health expenditures." 9 Although derived from 1994 data,
this figure is identical to the proportion of total Medicare home health
expenditures (35%) used in 1996 to treat the six most frequently reported
diagnostic conditions: diabetes mellitus, heart failure, essential
hypertension, osteoarthrosis and allied disorders, cerebrovascular disease
and allied disorders, and chronic airway obstruction. 2 ° Each of these
conditions is predominantly chronic in nature, requiring some form of
long-term care; it would seem logical that a sizeable proportion of the
users in the "long-term care" segment of the Medicare home health
population would be afflicted with these conditions.
In contrast, the "medically complex" beneficiaries, who comprised
33% of the total user population, were generally more expensive,
accounting for an estimated 42.5% of total Medicare home health
expenditures (see Appendix, Figure 7).12 1 The members of this beneficiary
cohort were seriously ill and more likely to have functional impairments.
These individuals required substantially more hospital care and, for
elderly who live alone may still have access to relatives and friends living elsewhere, although the
intensity and amount of care that can be provided is reduced.
As to the broader elderly population, a report by the New York State Office for the Aging stated
that 53% of the non-institutionalized elderly live with their spouses, 30% live alone, 15% live with
other relatives, and 2% live with a nonrelative. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR THE AGING,
FAMILY CAREGIVING AND ELDERLY: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 6 (1983).
117 Linda K. Scharer, Informal Supports, in GERIATRIC HOME HEALTH CARE: THE
COLLABORATION OF PHYSICIANS, NURSES, AND SOCIAL WORKERS 41, 41 (Philip W. Brickner et al.
eds., 1997). The national economic value of informal caregiving was estimated in 1997 to be $196
billion--dwarfing the amount spent on formal home health care ($32 billion) and nursing home care
($83 billion). See Peter S. Amo et al., The Economic Value ofInformal Caregiving, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 182, 184-85. These figures only assess the market value of the informal services
rendered based on the number of caregiving hours and the market wage rate, however, and do not
measure such costs inflicted upon the caregiver as stress, family destabilization, impoverishment, and
enhanced risk of physical and mental health disorders. See id. at 186.
118 See LEON ETAL., supra note 32, at 16-19.
119 See id. at 19.
120 See Medicare-Medicaid Supplement, supra note 82, at 92-93.
121 SeeLEONET AL.,supranote 32, at 17-18.
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approximately one-half of the group, were admitted to an SNF within the
same year.'
22
However, the KFF study also noted that the distribution of home
health expenditures was disproportionately generated by a small user
cohort. In 1994, these "high utilizers," who had 200 or more visits per
year, constituted only 10% of the Medicare home health population, while
accounting for 43% of program expenditures. 23 They used substantially
more skilled nursing and, in particular, home health aide visits.
Furthermore, the high utilizers were much more likely to be female,
African-American, poor, and in poor health (see Appendix, Figure 8).124
Nearly half of the members of this group were in the "medically complex"
category, while another 38% were in the "long-term care" user cohort.
25
While these statistics offer little insight into the sources and
determinants of "unnecessary care," they provide the foundation upon
which to construct an assessment of both how the burden of cost-sharing is
likely to be allocated and the nature of possible beneficiary responses to
cost-sharing.
IV. Cost-sharing and Medicare Home Health: Theory and Practice
Considerable uncertainty plagues any attempt to predict beneficiaries'
responses to the application of cost-sharing to Medicare home health care.
To begin with, there is an inadequate number of empirical studies
estimating the effects of cost-sharing on the elderly; none addresses the
application of cost-sharing to Medicare home health. In the absence of
direct empirical evidence, then, one might look to studies examining the
elasticity of demand for various medical commodities (e.g., preventive
care, acute care, dental care) in the general population. However, it is not
immediately obvious which type of medical service would constitute the
appropriate analogue to home health care. Moreover, unlike some medical
services, there is no medical consensus regarding when home health
services are "necessary." Thus, it is difficult to distinguish unnecessary
from necessary usage, undermining one of the primary stated objectives of
beneficiary cost-sharing. Finally, the widespread presence of private
supplemental insurance, which generally covers cost-sharing under
Medicare, may further impact usage. This Part examines these problems.
122 See id. at 17.
123 Seeid. at 19.
124 See id. at 20.
125 Seeid. at21.
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A. Medical Necessity and Beneficiary Perceptions
Home health care tends to confound the paradigm of medical
"necessity" or "appropriateness." In a pioneering Health Services
Utilization Study, RAND researchers designated a procedure or
intervention as "appropriate" where, based upon the recommendation of a
panel of experts, the "expected health benefit (i.e., increased life
expectancy, relief of pain, reduction of anxiety, improved functional
capacity) exceed[s] the expected negative consequences (i.e., mortality,
morbidity, anxiety of anticipating the procedure, pain produced by the
procedure, time lost from work) by a sufficiently wide margin that the
procedure [is] worth doing."'26 Unfortunately, the application of the
RAND cost-benefit approach to medical appropriateness or effectiveness
is singularly problematic in the home health context.
First, not only is there no consensus within the medical community
over the medical benefits associated with home health services, but also
these benefits may not be captured by the clinical focus of the definition.
Thus, skilled nursing visits to the home in which an insulin injection might
be administered, for example, seem to resonate with our conception of
tasks that are in some sense "medical" and of obvious necessity to patient
health and functioning. In contrast, it may be difficult to reconcile home
health aide assistance in undertaking chores and other activities of daily
living with our intuitions about medical treatment. Indeed, some services,
such as occupational therapy and housework assistance, seem more geared
toward improving patient quality of life than treating an ailment. The
clinical focus of the RAND definition generally excludes broader
considerations of beneficiary quality of life.' 27 However, even under the
strict confines of the RAND definition, it is conceivable that certain home
health aide assistance qualifies as medically "appropriate." For example, if
a patient is unable to feed himself, there is no question that the kind of
assistance provided by home health aides is vital to continuing health.
The meager evidence available provides some empirical support for
the medical efficacy of home health services. As a general matter, elderly
patients overwhelmingly prefer to remain in the home, presumably for the
independence and psychic benefits it affords them. 28 If one is willing to
126 Rolla Edward Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate Indications for Six Medical
and Surgical Procedures, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 766, 767 (1986). The RAND Corporation
inaugurated "appropriateness research" in the 1980s with its Health Services Utilization Study. See
Virginia A. Sharpe & Alan 1. Faden, Appropriateness in Patient Care: A New Conceptual Framework,
74 MILBANK Q. 115, 115 (1996). However, this paradigmatic conception has been subjected to serious
criticism. See id. at 116-20 This Note will employ the terms "necessary" and "unnecessary," despite
criticism of this terminology. See id. at 132.
127 See Sharpe & Faden, supra note 126, at 118, 126.
128 See WIENER, supra note 2, at 5, 241-42 (noting the strong preference expressed by the
Vol. 17:137, 2000
The Price of Reform
move beyond the clinical focus of the RAND definition, these benefits are
not insignificant. In addition, some doctors also find that the home setting
provides a better environment for rehabilitation than an institutional
setting. 129 Finally, there is some evidence that home health care can reduce
the need for hospitalization and acute services. 130 However, there is
ultimately no consensus in the medical community regarding the
circumstances under which home health services are medically
appropriate.
31
A related concern in determining the appropriateness of a given
procedure is the presence of substitutes, a consideration that the RAND
conception fails to address. Thus, if a given substitute for home health care
(e.g., a SNF, hospital, or informal care) is either more beneficial to the
patient or comparatively less costly to provide, one might be inclined to
view the home health option as "unnecessary." The interests of the patient
and the public fisc (assuming public funding of a given medical service)
arguably require that patients and providers take these considerations into
account when making treatment decisions.
However, evaluating the relative medical efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of alternatives can be a complicated, context-specific, and
normatively problematic undertaking. For example, many beneficiary
conditions are treated more effectively in a hospital setting, particularly
where treatment is invasive or complex. In contrast, while many of the
services provided by HHAs could be provided with equal effectiveness in
inpatient and SNF settings, the latter treatment options can be considerably
elderly in surveys to remain in their homes and not to be institutionalized). For example, a 1988 Louis
Harris and Associates poll noted that 78% of respondents would "prefer to receive care .. .in (their)
own home." See id. at 242; see also MARGRET K. STRAW, AARP, HOME CARE: ATTITUDES AND
KNOWLEDGE OF MIDDLE-AGED AND OLDER AMERICANS (1991).
129 Based upon his experience with the patients treated by the Yale Geriatric Assessment
Unit (YGAU), Dr. Sidney Bogardus concludes that rehabilitation therapy works better in the home.
Indeed, the aim of the YGAU is to craft a plan to facilitate the return of patients to their homes.
However, he concedes that it would be difficult to find hard clinical data to support his conclusions.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Sidney Bogardus, Director, Yale Geriatric Assessment Unit, Yale-New
Haven Hospital (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Bogardus Interview).
130 See, e.g., Susan L. Hughes et al., Impact of Home Care on Hospital Days: A Meta
Analysis, 32 HEALTH SER. RES. 415 (1997) (concluding that home care was shown by a majority of the
412 studies analyzed to have a small-to-moderate effect on reducing hospital stays); Mary D. Naylor et
al., Comprehensive Discharge Planning and Home Follow-up of Hospitalized Elders, A Randomized
Clinical Trial, 281 JAMA 613 (1999) (noting that a comprehensive discharge planning process
implemented by advanced practice nurses enabled home care to reduce the rate of hospital
readmissions, lengthen the time between discharge and readmission, and decrease the costs of
providing health care).
131 See Rosalie A. Kane et al., Perspectives on Home Care Quality, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Fall 1994, at 69, 71 (noting that "[quality assurance] in home care is at an early stage of
development"); Bogardus Interview, supra note 129. Of course, this observation does not deny
agreement on extreme cases. For example, an individual who fakes or exaggerates his condition to
shift homemaking responsibilities onto the shoulders of a home health aide unquestionably abuses the
system. Nonetheless, aside from these "ideal types," judgments of medical necessity are problematic.
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more expensive than home health care.132 The complexity of these kinds of
judgments is compounded by the question of whether the costs under
consideration are solely those borne by the public fisc or whether they
include other, often non-quantifiable costs (including those borne by
caregivers). While policy-makers may be tempted to force home health
users to rely on informal and family-provided care to reduce the burden on
the public fisc, the resulting care burden can exert a considerable strain on
family emotional and financial resources. 3 3  Finally, the medical
"necessity" of a given procedure is unclear where the objectives of
medical efficacy and cost-effectiveness conflict. Where a given procedure
is more effectively administered in the home, yet costs the Medicare
program more to administer in that setting, how does one decide? The
dilemmas discussed in this paragraph-i.e., whether to place the care
burden on the patient's family and whether to prefer patient welfare to
budgetary considerations-reveal the centrality of values in judgments
regarding medical necessity. 1
34
As the preceding discussion indicates, considerable uncertainty
clouds efforts to discern the "objective" necessity of home health services.
Does this imply that the concepts of appropriateness and medical necessity
are meaningless in the home health context? Far from it. First, I assume a
definition of "appropriateness"'13 that includes both the RAND criteria and
broader quality-of-life considerations. In addition, I assume that
"appropriateness" encompasses an evaluation of alternatives in terms of
cost- and medical-effectiveness. If we assess appropriateness in this
fashion, it is not difficult to conceive of limiting cases where home health
services are, indeed, "unnecessary." For example, if a moderately arthritic
132 The American National Hospital Panel Reports indicate that in 1994, the average
inpatient operating expense per hospital day was $1060. See'Carolyn S. Donham et al., Health Care
Indicators, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 295, 302 tbl.1 (1994). Furthermore, SNF costs can be as high
as $46,000 per year. See The Advocate's Toolkit: Talking Points (visited May 15, 1999)
<http://www.ltccampaign.org/advocate/case.htm>. In contrast, home health care cost an average of $84
per visit in 1995. See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 6 tbl. 1. Assuming that a patient were to use
home health services 365 days per year, the total annual cost at the preceding rate would be $30,660.
Of course, unlike home health care, SNF expenditures include meals, housing, and other costs, in
addition to medical services. But see William G. Weissert et al., The Past and Future of Home- and
Community-Based Long-Term Care, 66 MILBANK Q. 309 (1988) (arguing that home care only
produces minimal therapeutic benefits and may even increase overall cost when compared to SNF).
133 See, e.g., Bob G. Knight et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Interventions for Caregiver
Distress: Recommendations for Future Research, 33 GERONTOLOGIST 240 (1993); Leonard 1. Pearlin
et al., Caregiving and the Stress Process: An Overview of Concepts and Their Measures, 30
GERONTOLOGIST 583 (1990); Marilyn M. Skaff & Leonard 1. Pearlin, Caregiving: Role Engulfment
and the Loss of Self, 32 GERONTOLOGIST 656 (1992); see also supra note 113.
134 See Sharpe & Faden, supra note 126, at 119 ("[T]he concept of appropriateness is
fundamentally evaluative. It is variously informed by the norms and values of science, of medicine, of
individuals, and of society. Determinations of the appropriateness of a procedure therefore should not
be regarded simply, or even primarily, as an evidentiary problem.., but rather as a problem of values
assessment.").
135 1 employ the terms "appropriateness" and "medical necessity" interchangeably.
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elderly Medicare beneficiary were to receive home health aide assistance
in cleaning, bathing, eating, and household chores seven days per week,
one might be dubious of the value of such services in light of the
beneficiary's modest impairment. One might also suspect that less-costly
alternatives, such as self-care and informal care, could supplant formal
home care at minimal cost to the patient and/or his friends and
relatives. 36Aside from this type of limiting case, however, more clinical
work needs to be undertaken before meaningful criteria for both medical-
and cost-effectiveness can be derived. Central to such an undertaking is a
more explicit statement by Congress of the values that are to animate
Medicare payment policy. Given the inherently value-laden nature of
appropriateness judgments, authoritative normative guidance is required.
However, even if one were able to arrive at meaningful criteria for
assessing appropriateness decisions in the home health context, any cost-
sharing regime would have to confront the fact that beneficiaries-the
targets of cost-sharing-may lack the information necessary to make
judgments according to these criteria. 137 As a general matter, any patient
facing the prospect of medical treatment confronts multiple sources of
uncertainty. As Kenneth Arrow writes:
Uncertainty as to the quality of the product is perhaps more intense [in
medicine] than in any other important commodity. Recovery from
disease is as unpredictable as its incidence. In most commodities, the
possibility of learning from one's own experience or that of others is
strong because there is an adequate number of trials. In the case of severe
illness, that is, in general, not true; the uncertainty due to inexperience is
added to the intrinsic difficulty of prediction.13
8
Moreover, there is an asymmetry of information between doctor and
patient. The doctor is presumably much better informed about the patient's
condition and about what treatment is required than is the patient; both
doctor and patient are aware of this asymmetry'
39
The patient may, therefore, be inclined to defer to the doctor or
nurse's recommendations regarding needed care. As was mentioned
136 However, it is difficult to see how that particular scenario could occur in reality, given
that the patient still has to qualify as "homebound" and receive a doctor's certification of necessity. See
supra notes 61, 66, 109 and accompanying text. It is conceivable that a beneficiary might legitimately
need such assistance and yet lack effective recourse to any of the substitutes for home health care. In
such cases, the financial burden associated with cost-sharing might lead him to decline truly necessary
care and suffer the medical consequences. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
137 For those beneficiaries whose cognitive impairments require a caregiver or guardian to
make medical decisions on their behalf, the same difficulties apply.
138 Arrow, supra note 94, at 951; see also Conrad & Marmor, supra note 30, at 211.
139 See Arrow, supra note 94, at 951-52, 964-66; Susan Edgman-Levitan & Paul D. Cleary,
What Information Do Consumers Want and Need?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 42.
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earlier, providers (particularly nurses) may have an incentive to over-
prescribe; 40 patient deference amidst this uncertainty would then result in
excessive care. Moreover, home health care lacks many of the built-in
deterrents to over-use that characterize other medical services not subject
to cost-sharing; these natural barriers include transportation costs, the cost
of lost time (in wages or leisure), and the pain sometimes associated with
medical care. 141 In addition to the absence of these constraints, it is also
possible that certain patients may possess an exaggerated sense of their
own condition, exhibiting a preference for more intensive care than is
perhaps warranted. These patients might therefore either acquiesce in the
provider's possibly inflated recommendation or demand additional care.
However, cost-sharing could, in theory, cause patients either to
refrain from pushing for additional care or to reject provider
recommendations. If the financial disincentives are great enough, patients
may even reject care that both they and the provider perceive as central to
health maintenance. Alternatively, if the beneficiary perceives the
treatment to be sufficiently important, he may simply maintain home
health usage and absorb the financial consequences of cost-sharing.
Beneficiaries' financial status and cognitive capacity will further affect
their reactions to cost-sharing, as will the availability and perceived cost of
substitutes such as SNF, hospital, and informal resources.
Thus, the uniquely high degree of uncertainty associated with
determining the medical "necessity" of home health services compounds
the difficulty of predicting how the conflicting incentives and factors
facing beneficiaries will affect their reaction to cost-sharing.' 42 More
fundamentally, patients' difficulty in perceiving which services are
"necessary" makes the findings of the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment (HIE) even more salient-i.e., that cost-sharing tends to
reduce in equal amounts the use of both necessary and unnecessary
medical services. 43 Far from being a precise means of paring away
unnecessary use, cost-sharing is therefore likely to be a relatively blunt
instrument, having indiscriminate and somewhat arbitrary effects on
beneficiaries.
Although reaction to cost-sharing will differ among patients and
beneficiary cohorts, I will trace general tendencies in light of the
characteristics of the beneficiary population. In subsequent Sections, I will
also examine whether cost-sharing scenarios involving other medical
140 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
141 These built-in demand constraints on "free care" usage are outlined in Conrad & Marmor,
supra note 30, at 209.
142 See Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 251-52.
143 See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR ALL?
LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 173-74, 180 (1993) [hereinafter HIE].
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services, which have been the subject of empirical study, shed any light on
this subject.
B. Home Health Care and Other Medical Services: Empirical Evidence
Although they have been criticized for design and data-collection
flaws, 44 a number of studies have examined the impact of cost-sharing on
both the use of medical services and health outcomes. Unfortunately, little
empirical work has been done on the effects of cost-sharing on the
elderly, 145 and no study has examined the response of elderly home health
beneficiaries to cost-sharing. In this Section, I will explore the ways in
which existing studies in cost-sharing shed light on the possible response
of the Medicare home health beneficiary population.
Different medical services tend to elicit different demand elasticities;
although trying to compare demand responsiveness among studies is an
inherently treacherous undertaking, a rough rank-ordering can at least be
attempted for some of the principal medical service categories. As a
Stanford University experiment revealed, adults exhibit highly elastic
demand patterns vis-A-vis preventive services such as physical exams; for
example, adult nonprofessional males reduced the number of physical
examinations sought by 51% when 25% coinsurance was introduced.
46
Emergency room visits and inpatient care seem to be the next most elastic
medical services. In the RAND HIE, patients facing 25% coinsurance for
emergency room services had approximately 33% fewer visits than those
without cost-sharing. 47 The United Mine Workers' (UMW) health plan
study conducted by Scheffler found that the probability of hospitalization
dropped 29.4% under a more draconian cost-sharing arrangement.
48
144 As Thomas Rice and Kathleen Morrison note, these studies frequently lack sufficient data
(particularly due to the predominantly cross-sectional nature of their design) and encounter selection
bias. Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 237-38.
145 For an exception to this gap in the literature, see infra note 164.
146 This natural experiment, conducted at Stanford University in the late 1960s, revealed
that, among nonprofessional adult males, physical examinations fell by 51.2% when a 25%
coinsurance requirement was introduced. For professional and faculty males, the decline was slightly
less than 25%. See Anne A. Scitovsky & Nelda M. Snyder, Effect of Coinsurance on the Use of
Physician Services, SOC. SECURITY BULL., June 1972, at 3, 16 tbl.13; see also Anne A. Scitovsky &
Nelda McCall, Coinsurance and the Demand for Physician Services: Four Years Later, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., May 1977, at 19. For a critical assessment of this study's methodology and its
applicability to contemporary conditions, see Charles E. Phelps & Joseph P. Newhouse, Effect of
Coinsurance: A Multivariate Analysis, SOC. SECURITY BULL., June 1972, at 20; and Rice & Morrison,
supra note 30, at 240.
147 See HIE, supra note 143, at 152-65. The HIE was conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s
by the RAND Corporation and used a true experimental design to determine the responsiveness of use
and cost to various cost-sharing arrangements. The effects of cost-sharing on health outcomes were
also examined. Although the literature critically examining this landmark study is vast, a useful
introduction to the methodological limitations and advantages of the study is in Rice & Morrison,
supra note 30, at 240-48.
148 See Richard M. Scheftler, The United Mine Workers' Health Plan: An Analysis of the
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Dental visits, prescription drugs, and physician visits exhibited
smaller elasticities, yet were relatively similar in magnitude. The HIE
study revealed that there were roughly 27% fewer dental visits under a
25% coinsurance requirement. 49 Prescription drugs exhibited similar
elasticities, although they differed slightly according to the effect on cost
and on use. The HIE indicated that individuals under 25% coinsurance
were only 23% less likely to fill a prescription, whereas expenses on
prescription drugs were likely to be approximately 30% less. 50 As regards
physician visits, the Stanford study indicated 24% fewer visits per capita
for patients facing 25% coinsurance.' 5' Under the cost-sharing provisions
of the UMW study, the probability of patients obtaining physician visits
was shown to have declined by 36%.152
The challenge, ultimately, is to determine which medical service most
closely resembles home health care, holding all other factors constant.
However, to draw meaningful comparisons, it is necessary to postulate the
causal mechanisms underlying the differences in elasticities among the
five medical services outlined above. Clearly, the presence of substitutes
and the price differential among different types of medical services drives
some of the differential. For example, given their prophylactic nature,
preventive services typically do not present the patient with an
immediately pressing need; faced with cost-sharing, the patient may be
more likely to defer such services or forego them altogether. Moreover,
many inpatient services can be provided through the less-expensive
physician visit, encouraging substitution. Patients may be less willing to
substitute in the other direction (i.e., substitute inpatient for physician
services), given the difference in cost.'53
Examination of the treatments associated with the six most-
commonly diagnosed conditions for which home health services were
employed might indicate whether some of the same causal factors are at
play. These six conditions-diabetes mellitus, heart failure, essential
Cost-sharing Program, 22 MED. CARE 247, 249 tbl. 1 (1984). Scheffler examined a natural experiment
in cost-sharing. In 1977, the UMW health plan introduced a $250 annual inpatient hospital deductible
and a 40% coinsurance rate on physician and most outpatient services, with an annual out-of-pocket
maximum of $500 per family. See id. at 247. For subsequent studies of the UMW case, see Marianne
C. Fahs, Physician Response to the United Mine Workers' Cost-Sharing Program: The Other Side of
the Coin, 27 HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH 25 (1992); Pamela C. Roddy et al., Cost Sharing and the Use
of Health Services: The United Mine Workers ofAmerica Health Plan, 24 MED. CARE 873 (1986). For
a discussion of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the preceding studies, see Rice &
Morrison, supra note 30, at 249-51.
149 HIE, supra note 143, at 51-60.
150 Id. at 165-68.
151 See Scitovsky & Snyder, supra note 146, at 12 tbl.ll. Physician visits for minor
complaints ("general practice" services) fell by 22% under cost-sharing. See id.
152 See Scheffler, supra note 148, at 251.
153 Indeed, the HIE results provide further confirmation of the reluctance of patients to
substitute inpatient for outpatient services generally. HIE, supra note 143, at 172-76.
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hypertension, osteoarthrosis, cerebrovascular disease, and chronic airway
obstruction 154-are largely chronic, requiring a mixture of skilled and
unskilled care. Unfortunately, none of these studies specifically addressed
the response of the chronically ill to cost-sharing. Moreover, the overall
physical condition and care requirements of individuals with these
illnesses vary considerably depending on the severity of the ailment. Thus,
diabetics-the largest group of home health recipients"5-may require
ostensibly skilled care in the form of assistance in monitoring their blood
sugar levels and delivering injections. However, they may also require
additional home health aide assistance with activities of daily living,
depending on the severity of their conditions (i.e., if their conditions are
compounded by strokes or cognitive disorders). The severity and nature of
their conditions also dictate the extent to which diabetics would be able to
substitute formal care with self-care by, for example, administering
injections themselves. 5 6 The pain and difficulty they might experience in
conducting self-care would further raise the effective "price" of self-care
as a substitute. Furthermore, the accessibility of relatives and family
members would further dictate the extent to which informal care could be
substituted for formal home health care. The severity of the patient's
debilitation would also determine the burden that might be imposed on
informal caregivers through substitution, determining the "relative price"
(often perceived in non-monetary terms) affecting the decision of when
and how much to substitute. Thus, the availability and effective "price" of
substitutes can only be determined through highly context-sensitive
judgments contingent on a number of factors specific to beneficiary
characteristics. Generalizations as to the similarity between home health
care and other medical services are therefore deeply problematic.
C. Beneficiary Characteristics and Demand Response
1. Income
The lower incomes of Medicare home health beneficiaries might lead
them to be exceedingly responsive to cost-sharing. As the KFF study
revealed, the incomes of Medicare home health beneficiaries are markedly
lower than those of the larger Medicare population. As a general matter,
non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries spend an average of 21% of
their incomes on health care, with Medicare covering only 55% of their
154 See supra note 88.
155 See id.
156 See Bogardus Interview, supra note 129.
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total health care costs. 1 57 As the KFF study indicates, Medicare home
health beneficiaries incur significantly greater health care costs than
members of the larger Medicare population.' Given the extent of their
physical impairment, the long-term care and' "medically complex"
Medicare home health beneficiaries undoubtedly spend an even higher
percentage of their income on out-of-pocket health care costs. Like other
Medicare beneficiaries, members of these vulnerable cohort groups face
high copayments and deductibles for most Medicare services, as well as
other non-covered health care costs, including increasingly burdensome
prescription drug costs. 5 9 In light of their precarious financial situation,
therefore, one might expect Medicare home health beneficiaries-
particularly the long-term care and medically-complex beneficiaries 60-to
be highly responsive to cost-sharing.161
The empirical literature on cost-sharing seems to bear out the
predicted responsiveness of low-income beneficiaries. While the HIE and
the Scitovsky studies did not indicate a significant relationship between
income and the use of medical care, 62 the 1972 Scitovsky-Snyder study
offered some evidence to indicate that lower-income persons were less
likely than other income cohorts to see a physician after the introduction of
cost-sharing. 63  Moreover, studies of the effects of introducing cost-
157 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 133-34 (1999).
158 See supra text accompanying note 114.
159 A recent study by the National Academy of Social Insurance asserted that half of all
people on Medicare have out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses of less than $200 per year.
However, the study also noted that 4.5 million Americans spend $1000 or more annually on
prescription drugs, while at least 1.3 million spend over $2000 per year. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that many seniors are forced to choose between food and prescription drugs. See William M. Welch &
Susan Page, Drug Benefit Newest Twist in Debate over Medicare, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 1999, at I A.
Moreover, the Medicare Board of Trustees estimates that 40% of Medicare beneficiaries will lack any
coverage for prescription drug costs by the year 2000. Currently, only three Medigap policies cover,
prescription drugs. See id. at 2A. For a discussion of the literature examining the health-care costs
faced by the elderly, see generally Gary L. Gaumer & Joanna Stavins, Medicare Use in the Last Ninety
Days of Life, 26 HEALTH SERV. RES. 725 (1992).
160 The KFF study revealed that 19.6% of the "long-term care" cohort had incomes of $5000
or less (compared to 14.3% of the rest of the Medicare home health population). Although the
difference is slight, 56.7% of the long-term care group had incomes between $5000 and $15,001, as
compared to 55.5% for the larger Medicare home health beneficiary pool. While fewer "medically-
complex" users faced the extremely low incomes of $5000 or less (11.5%) than members of the long-
term care group, more had incomes in the next bracket (60%). See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at
tbl.4a.
161 The rationale for this inference may seem obvious. As Rice and Morrison state, "[t]he
effect of cost sharing on the poor may be stronger because seemingly minor financial requirements
may constitute a significant proportion of disposable income." Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 253.
162 See HIE, supra note 143, at 45-47; Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the
Demand for Medical Care Utilization: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
251, 269 (1987).
163 The Scitovsky-Snyder study found that faculty use of physician visits declined 23.1%
following the introduction of coinsurance; professional and nonprofessional staff witnessed 25% and
24.4% declines, respectively. Scitovsky & Snyder, supra note 146, at 8 tbl.5. When adjusted for age,
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sharing into California's Medicaid programs (Medi-Cal) in 1972 provided
further evidence that relatively small copayments resulted in the use of less
outpatient care. 164 Finally, two Canadian studies confirm the heightened
responsiveness of lower-income users to cost-sharing.1
65
Of greater concern is the enhanced likelihood demonstrated by the
empirical literature that cost-sharing will diminish the health status of
lower-income beneficiaries. Under the HIE, for example, lower-income
participants facing cost-sharing experienced higher diastolic blood
pressure, greater risk of death, and the use of fewer highly effective
medical services.1 66 The Medi-Cal experience also demonstrated that the
reduced utilization of outpatient care among lower-income beneficiaries
due to cost-sharing resulted in higher hospitalization rates.1
67
the figures for faculty, professionals, and nonprofessionals were 24.7%, 23.5%, and 27.4%,
respectively. See id. Given that nonprofessionals typically exhibit income levels that are significantly
lower than those of faculty and lower (albeit to a lesser extent) than those of professional employees,
the preceding results provide tentative confirmation of a positive correlation between income and
physician visits when coinsurance is imposed.
Moreover, the study indicated that nonprofessional staff were more likely to have zero physician
visits following the introduction of coinsurance. The percentage of nonprofessionals without a single
physician visit increased from 14.4% before coinsurance to 25.5% after its introduction (an increase of
77.1%). See id. at 11 tbl.9. For comparison, 22.1% of professional staff and 15% of faculty did not use
a physician visit in the wake of coinsurance-an increase from previous levels of 47.3% and 31.6%,
respectively. See id.
164 See Earl W. Brian & Stephen F. Gibbens, California's Medi-Cal Copayment Experiment,
12 MED. CARE 4, 28-34 (Supp. 1974) (noting that a $1 copayment appeared to reduce the use of
certain preventive services, yet was a less serious deterrent for those with more serious medical
conditions); Jay Helms et al., Copayments and Demand for Medical Care: The California Medicaid
Experience, 9 BELL J. ECON. 192, 192 (1978) (noting an 8% decrease in physician visits); Milton I.
Roemer et al., Copaymentsfor Ambulatory Care: Penny-Wise and Pound-Foolish, 13 MED. CARE 457,
465-66 (1975) (finding that copayments reduced utilization of physician office visits, urinalysis, and
pap smears); see also Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 255-57.
165 The introduction of a modest copayment for physician visits in Saskatchewan reduced
annual usage for all income groups by 5.6%. See R.G. Beck & J.M. Home, Utilization of Publicly
Insured Health Services in Saskatchewan Before, During and After Copayment, 18 MED. CARE 787,
787 (1980). A different study of the Saskatchewan experience noted that copayments reduced usage
among low-income persons by approximately 18%-roughly three times the average. See R.G. Beck,
The Effects of Co-Payment on the Poor, J. HUM. RESOURCES 129, 129 (1974).
A 1980 survey showed that, faced with "extra billing," lower-income persons were more likely
than higher-income persons to report that they reduced their use of physician services or delayed
seeking care. See G.L. Stoddart & C.A. Woodward, The Effect of Physician Extra Billing on Patients'
Access to Care and Attitudes Toward the Ontario Health System 9 (May 1980) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the McMaster University Library).
There are undoubtedly risks in applying data from the experiences of the Canadian system,
given the differing composition of its medical sector, its unique demographic characteristics, etc.
However, the "low-income effect" exhibited in these studies merely underscores the evidence from
American studies. Moreover, in light of the numerous changes in the U.S. health-care market over the
past thirty years, one might argue that it is equally hazardous to apply results from American studies in
the 1970s to the present day. Ultimately, the paucity of empirical research in this area leaves one with
little choice but to look at all available data.
166 HIE, supra note 143, at 183-243; see also Robert H. Brook et al., Does Free Care
Improve Adults' Health? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426,
1432-33 (1983).
167 See Helms et al., supra note 164, at 200 (noting a 17% increase in total MediCal
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On the basis of the preceding evidence, one might conclude that
Medicare home health beneficiaries would react to cost-sharing by
significantly reducing their home health usage, with possibly deleterious
health consequences. Particularly given the questionable availability and
effectiveness of substitutes for home health care in many instances,1 68 the
beneficiaries may simply reduce needed care.
2. Health Status
The effect of health status on the use of health services is more
difficult to predict. It might be supposed that sicker individuals would be
less respongive to cost-sharing, given their more pressing need for care. In
light of the seriously compromised health status of Medicare home health
beneficiaries, one might similarly infer low price-elasticity. However, the
HIE demonstrated that coinsurance reduced service usage in roughly equal
amounts for the healthy and the sick, 169 undermining this hypothesis.
Alternatively, one might predict that the chronically-ill segment of
the Medicare home health population would be unresponsive or only
marginally responsive to cost-sharing. Medicare home health services may
be perceived by long-term care beneficiaries as central to their well-being,
given that their medical needs and ADL limitations may require home
health services on a daily basis. Unfortunately, there is little evidence
indicating how the chronically-ill react to cost-sharing. One of the Medi-
Cal studies might provide loose confirmation of the above hypothesis, as it
indicated that the greater the significance of a health service to the patient,
the less that cost-sharing reduced usage.170 In addition, a study by Link et
al. indicated that the elimination of Medicare cost-sharing through
Medigap insurance increased the number of physician visits by the non-
chronically-ill by 42%; for those with at least one chronic condition, this
increase was only 5%.17 Thus, the presence of cost-sharing may have little
hospitalization time after imposition of a $1 copayment for physician visits); Roemer et al., supra note
164, at 462-65 (observing that hospitalization rates increased more for those facing copayments than
for those without cost-sharing).
168 As noted earlier, SNF and hospital care are typically much more expensive than home
health care, and the elderly overwhelmingly prefer home treatment to institutional care. In addition, the
quality of informal care is often lower than that provided by HHAs. Moreover, self-care may not be a
viable substitute for some beneficiaries due to their physical impairments. Finally, beneficiaries may
not judge accurately when a given substitute is medically appropriate or when reduction of usage can
be undertaken safely. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
169 See Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific Analyses in a Rhndomized Controlled Trial, 24 MED.
CARE SI, S36-$37 (Supp. 1986).
170 See Brian & Gibbens, supra note 164, at 40-41.
171 See Charles R. Link et al., Cost Sharing, Supplementary Insurance, and Health Services
Utilization Among the Medicare Elderly, 2 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 25 (1980); see also Sandra
Christensen et al., Acute Health Care Costs for the Aged Medicare Population: Overview and Policy
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impact on usage among chronically-ill Medicare home health
beneficiaries.
In sum, the income and health characteristics of the Medicare home
health population tend to cut in opposite directions (at least for
chronically-ill beneficiaries): one would expect lower income to yield high
responsiveness to cost-sharing, whereas the need for long-term care may
render demand relatively inelastic. The ultimate resolution of these
conflicting tendencies is likely to be highly context-specific, and it would
probably require rigorous empirical work for a firm conclusion to be
established. However, under either scenario (i.e., reduced usage or
constant usage), vertical equity concerns are apparent. On the one hand, if
they maintain their pre-cost-sharing levels of home health usage,
beneficiaries-particularly long-term-care and medically-complex
individuals, whose usage is more intense than that of the rest of the
population-would bear an enhanced, significant economic burden
because of cost-sharing. On the other hand, if beneficiaries ultimately
reduce their usage of home health services, they may experience a less
profound economic effect, yet their health may be at risk due to the
reduced usage. Thus, cost-sharing raises serious vertical equity concerns
along both the income and health axes.
D. Supplemental Insurance
One might argue that the vertical equity considerations described
above have less or no salience given the availability of private
supplemental ("Medigap") insurance policies, which cover cost-sharing
under Medicare. Since the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of
1990 (OBRA 90),72 Medigap issuers have been required to offer policies
that conform to one of up to ten specific prototypes, offering varying
levels of benefits at correspondingly different premiums.1 73 One study
estimated that approximately 75% of the elderly had some form of private
insurance to supplement Medicare: 37% of the elderly were shown to
possess only Medigap policies, 33% had only employer-sponsored
policies, and 5% were covered under both types.1 74 However, HCFA
Options, 65 MILBANK Q. 397, 421-24 (1987) (noting that use of both inpatient and physician services
among Medigap enrollees is 24% higher than for those without supplementary coverage).
172 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter OBRA 90].
173 For a good discussion of the various policies mandated by OBRA 90, see Thomas Rice &
Kathleen Thomas, Evaluating the New Medigap Standardization Regulations, HEALTH AFF., Spring
1992, at 194.
174 See Chulis et al., supra note 31, at 17. Employer-sponsored insurance is less prevalent
among beneficiaries with lower incomes. Only 6.1% of beneficiaries with incomes of $5000 or less
have employer-sponsored insurance. 15% of beneficiaries with incomes between $5000 and $10,001
have such plans, while the figure for Medicare recipients with incomes between $10,000 and $15,001
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estimates that roughly 11% of Medicare beneficiaries have neither private
supplementary insurance nor Medicaid coverage, exposing them to full
cost-sharing liability. 7 5 Moreover, approximately 200,000 Medicare home
health beneficiaries lack both public and private supplemental coverage.
176
Of greatest concern are the "high-utilizers," who use 200 or more home
health visits per year and, therefore, face the most significant cost-sharing
burden; the KFF study noted that, in 1994, only 57.5% of these individuals
had Medigap coverage. 77 Kenney and Moon estimate that a 20%
coinsurance requirement applied in 1996 would have yielded an annual
cost increase of $1228 for the average Medicare home health user. t7 For
beneficiaries lacking private supplemental coverage, such a burden could
be significant indeed.
179
Even for those.beneficiaries who possess Medigap insurance, a rise in
premiums resulting from increased cost-sharing would place an additional
burden on incomes already strained by high health care costs. By one
estimate, assuming a 20% coinsurance rate applied to home health benefits
and a 20% administrative load, yearly premiums for Medigap policies
would have increased by roughly $113 in 1996.80 In addition, the
increasing prevalence of age-rating in Medigap insurance would place an
even greater burden on recipients over age eighty-five, who would face a
premium increase of approximately $300.181 Given that some 25.5% of
Medicare home health beneficiaries and 29.6% of long-term care users are
over eighty-four years old,'8 2 this burden may apply to a substantial
number of the most physically frail and low-income home health
is 36%. See id. at 18 tbl.l.
175 See Medicare-Medicaid Supplement, supra note 82, at 48. Medicaid does not generally
impose cost-sharing requirements on beneficiaries. For further discussion, see infra notes 176-82 and
accompanying text.
176 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 20. The KFF study noted that, in 1994, only
70.1% of home health beneficiaries had a private Medigap policy. See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at
tbl.3.
177 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at tbl.5a. It is not surprising that persons with worsened
health outcomes requiring more intense home health services should have reduced access to Medigap
coverage. As Karen Davis notes, "[wlith some important exceptions, MediGap plans often deny
coverage to elderly people with pre-existing conditions." KAREN DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
MEDICARE: OPTIONS FOR THE LONG TERM 8 (1997).
178 KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 19. The authors note, however, that this estimate
should be treated with some care, as these simulation numbers were drawn from a relatively small
sample in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Id. at 20 n.14.
179 For a discussion of the income characteristics of home health beneficiaries, see supra text
accompanying note 11l; and infra text accompanying notes 187 and 197. The average cost-sharing
burden faced by home health users in 1996 was $2473. See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 19
tbl.5; see also supra note 102.
180 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 102, at 20; see also MOON, supra note 102, at 159-61
(discussing the cost-savings and burden on beneficiaries associated with possible increases in the Part
B premium).
181 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 20.
182 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at tbl.4a.
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One might view Medicaid coverage as a factor mitigating the vertical
equity considerations noted in previous Parts. Thus, members of the "dual-
eligible" population-i.e., those who are eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid funding--could employ Medicaid reimbursement for home
health services to avoid Medicare cost-sharing. Indeed, the 1994 KFF
study confirmed the results of a previous study, finding that 24% of
Medicare home health users were also eligible for Medicaid.183 As one
would expect, increasing usage of home health services positively
correlates with dual eligibility. Thus, the KFF study noted that 27% of
"long-term" care users-whose elevated health-care costs tend to produce
lower incomes than those of other cohorts-were dual-eligible.
18 4
Moreover, the KFF study noted that 34.5% of the "high utilizers" with 200
or more home health visits per year were dual-eligible.185 In contrast,
another study found that 45% of this same Medicare home health cohort
were eligible for Medicaid.'
1 6
However, a significant portion of the home health population
possesses incomes that are low enough for cost-sharing to present a
burden, but still fails to qualify for Medicaid. Whereas 24% of home
health beneficiaries were estimated by the KFF study to be Medicaid dual-
eligible in 1994, 69.8% of the home health population had annual incomes
at or below $15,000.187 45.8% of Medicare beneficiaries, therefore, have
incomes at or below $15,000, yet fail to qualify for Medicaid. Given that
the 1994 poverty threshold for an individual over age sixty-five was
$7108,188 the impact of cost-sharing on those individuals falling outside
the Medicaid umbrella may be significant indeed.
183 See id. These results are identical to the results of Mauser and Miller's 1992 study of
Medicare home health beneficiaries, which found that 24% of Medicare home health users were dual-
eligible. See Mauser & Miller, supra note 82, at 20.
184 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at tbl.4a.
185 See id. at tbl.5a.
186 See Mauser & Miller, supra note 82, at 20.
187 See LEON ET AL., supra note 32, at tbl.5a.
188 See U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds: 1994 (visited Apr. 25, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh94.html>.
Yale Journal on Regulation o Vol. 17:137, 2000
2. "Medicaid Estate Planning"
Alternatively, one might argue that "Medicaid estate planning" would
allow many Medicare beneficiaries to "shelter or divest their assets" to
relatives "without first depleting their life savings,"'' 9 thereby qualifying
for Medicaid coverage and evading Medicare home health cost-sharing
without "real" impoverishment. However, Congress has enacted a number
of measures criminalizing and restricting the availability of such
techniques. 9° More importantly, the low incomes of the elderly population
make it unlikely that they would have either the incentives 9' or the
sophisticated information necessary to engage in Medicaid estate planning.
Indeed, the available evidence confirms the restricted availability of such
planning techniques, despite numerous allegations to the contrary. 92 Thus,
the possibility that a few beneficiaries might have recourse to Medicaid
estate planning fails to mitigate the concerns articulated above regarding
cost-sharing.
3. The Qualified Medicare Beneficiary Program
Another possible means of mitigating the effects of Medicare home
health cost-sharing is through the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB)
program. Medicare beneficiaries who do not qualify for Medicaid, yet
have incomes up to the federal poverty level and resources that are no
more than twice the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) resource level,
qualify for state coverage of all deductibles, coinsurance, and premiums
under Medicare Parts A and B. 93 Unfortunately, information concerning
189 Shawn Patrick Regan, Comment, Medicaid Estate Planning: Congress' Ersatz Solution
for Long- Term Health Care, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1217, 1222 (1995).
190 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4734, 111 Stat. 251, 522-23
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(a) (West Supp. 1999)); Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 217, 110 Stat. 1936, 2008-09 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(a) (West Supp. 1999)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 136 11 (a)(l), 107 Stat. 312, 622-23 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C.A. §
1396p(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999)); Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, §
303(b), 102 Stat. 683, 760-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)-(c)(4) (1994)); Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 324, 370-73
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1994)); Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b),
94 Stat. 3566, 3568 (repealed 1982). Numerous state measures to restrict such activities have also been
undertaken. For a discussion of one state's efforts in this area, see Kristin A. Reich, Note, Long-Term
Care Financing Crisis-Recent Federal and State Efforts To Deter Asset Transfers as a Means To
Gain Medicaid Eligibility, 74 N.D. L. REv. 383, 400-07 (1998).
191 See Joshua M. Wiener, Can Medicaid Long-Term Care Expenditures for the Elderly Be
Reduced?, 36 GERONTOLOGIST 800, 803 (1996).
192 See id. at 802-03.
193 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(p) (West Supp. 1999); see also 42 C.F.R. § 409.5 (1994).
Whereas individuals receiving these benefits qualify under the "QMB-Only" program, some
beneficiaries may be eligible for coverage of Part A and B premiums and Medicare cost-sharing, as
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the QMB benefit has been imperfectly disseminated; it has been estimated
that in 1991 over two million people (more than half of the elderly who
were eligible for QMB) were not receiving these benefits. 94 A 1996 study
estimated that approximately two-thirds of eligible beneficiaries were
receiving QMB benefits.' 95 As a recent Barents Group study revealed, the
QMB participation rate for Medicare home health users in 1996 was
slightly lower (62.4%)196
Moreover, even if all who qualified actually received QMB coverage,
the significant number of near-poor beneficiaries would still shoulder a
substantial cost-sharing burden. A 1992 study of Medicare home health
beneficiaries revealed that 54.6% of single beneficiaries over sixty-five
had incomes between $5000 and $15,001, while 41.3% of married users
had incomes within this range.' 97 The 1992 federal poverty guidelines for
these cohorts were $6652 and $8509, respectively. 198 In the absence of
more specific data, one can reasonably infer that a significant number of
beneficiaries falling within the $5000-$15,000 income cohort would
remain without QMB coverage.
More fundamentally, the difficulty with depending on either standard
Medicaid coverage-which may be attained through "Medicaid estate
planning"--or on coverage of Medicare cost-sharing through the QMB
program is that both methods merely shift the fiscal burden of the
Medicare home health benefit to the already burdened state Medicaid
rolls.199 Total Medicaid expenditures have increased at an average annual
rate of change (AARC) of 12.9% since 1975, rising from $12.1 billion in
1975 to $154.4 billion in 1996.20 Payments to aged beneficiaries rose over
the same period from $4.4 billion to $36.9 billion (AARC of 10.7%).2°I
Combined Medicaid expenditures on nursing home and home health care
for the elderly are projected to more than double between 1993 and 2018,
well as full Medicaid benefits ("QMB-Plus"). See BARENTS GROUP LLC, A PROFILE OF QMB-
ELIGIBLE AND SLMB-ELIGIBLE MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 47 app.A (1999).
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 affirmed that a state is not required to pay more for Medicare
cost-sharing than what that state's Medicaid program would have paid its Medicaid recipients who
were ineligible for QMB. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(n) (West Supp. 1999).
194 See FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, THE SECRET BENEFIT: THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE
MEDICARE BUY-IN TO POOR SENIORS I (1991).
195 See MARILYN MOON ET AL., THE URBAN INST., PROTECTING LOW INCOME MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES (Dec. 1996) <http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/protect.asp>.
196 BARENTS GROUP LLC, supra note 193, at 60 tbl.3.
197 See Mauser & Miller, supra note 82, at 20 tbl.l.
198 See Gordon M. Fisher, Poverty Guidelines for 1992, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Spring 1992,
at 44. Note that the latter statistic cited above ($8509) assumes a two-person family. See id.
199 See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 20 n.1 I (noting that "[s]ince Medicaid will also
be under pressure to reduce spending and may even become a block-granted program, it may be
undesirable to continue shifting new costs onto Medicaid").
200 See Medicare-Medicaid Supplement, supra note 82, at 144.
201 See id. at 152.
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increasing from $26 billion to $54.2 billion. °2 States have already
undertaken a variety of measures in an attempt to control these projected
increases in Medicaid costs. 203 However, the effectiveness of these
measures is still uncertain. Given the historic political vulnerability of the
Medicaid program, it may not be wise to shift additional burdens onto
these state programs; states may react by reducing benefits for long-term
care for the elderly, as well as for other needed programs. Ultimately, the
wisdom of simply shifting costs from one federal program to another is
questionable. 20 4 One of the touted objectives of cost-sharing is to reduce
the fiscal burden from the perspective of the taxpayers, not that of the
administrators of a given federal program.
4. The Specified Low Income Medicare Beneficiary Program
The Specified Low Income Medicare Beneficiary Program (SLMB)
also might mitigate some of the effects of cost-sharing on lower-income
Medicare home health beneficiaries. Under SLMB, states must cover
Medicare Part B premiums for low-income individuals whose incomes are
higher than the poverty level. Thus, beneficiaries whose income is between
100% and 120% of the poverty line and whose assets are no greater than
twice the SSI eligibility criteria may receive such assistance.0 5 In addition,
the BBA established the "Qualified Individual" benefit within SLMB,
wherein a block grant is given to the states for payment of Part B
premiums. Under the first variant of the Qualified Individual program (QI-
1), block grants cover individuals whose income is between 120% and
135% of the poverty line, whose resources do not exceed twice the SSI
eligibility limit, and who are not otherwise eligible for Medicaid.20 6 QI-2
allows individuals whose incomes fall between 135% and 175% of the
poverty line, whose resources are not in excess of twice the SSI limit, and
202 See WEINER, supra note 2, at 10 tbl.l-2. The figures noted above are in 1993 dollars. See
id.
203 For an excellent survey of such measures, see Weiner & Stevenson, supra note 82.
204 For example, the Long-Term Care Initiative, proposed in 1999 by the Clinton
Administration, includes a $1000 tax credit for beneficiaries and/or their caregivers. See Robert Pear,
Clinton Seeks Aid for Care of Those with Chronic Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at Al; Background:
President Clinton's Long-Term Care Initiative (Jan. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author). Such a program might conceivably be crafted so as to reimburse beneficiaries for cost-sharing
associated with Medicare home health usage. However, such an effort would merely shift the costs of
home health care to general revenues, while incurring administrative costs. Moreover, the objectives of
the Long-Term Care Initiative-to provide a modicum of relief to the chronically-ill and to mitigate
the burden felt by caregivers-would be undercut by channeling federal funding into cost-sharing.
Moreover, although their family members or caregivers might receive the tax credit, poorer
beneficiaries with no tax liability would not receive any coverage under the Long-Term Care Initiative.
See Background, supra, at 5.
205 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(E)(iii), 1396d(p)(l)(C) (West Supp. 1999).
206 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4732(a)(2) 111 Stat. 251, 520-
22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(iv), 1396d(p)(1) (West Supp. 1999)).
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who are not otherwise Medicaid-eligible to receive block-grant funding to
pay the portion of the Part B premium that is attributable to the shift of
Medicare home health benefits from Part A to Part B.2 °7
Unfortunately, the SLMB program would prove to be of limited
effectiveness in reducing the income burden associated with cost-sharing.
First, although many more home health beneficiaries would be eligible for
SLMB benefits than for QMB,2°8 they would not be exempt from cost-
sharing. As was mentioned earlier, if beneficiaries were to face 20%
coinsurance instituted in 1996, most home health beneficiaries would
experience a cost increase of approximately $1228.209 While beneficiaries
would save the not-insubstantial 1996 Part B premium of $5 10,210 they
would still owe $1228 for home-health cost-sharing.
Limited participation by beneficiaries in the SLMB program also
would reduce the program's effectiveness in protecting lower-income
beneficiaries from the home-health cost-sharing burden. SLMB enrollment
is even less widespread than for QMB; a 1996 study estimated that only
10% of eligible Medicare beneficiaries take advantage of the SLMB
program.21 ' The Barents Group study found home health beneficiaries
more likely to participate, though yet their participation rate was still low
(25.4%).212 Unfamiliarity with public benefit programs is possibly the
principal reason that the elderly do not take advantage of programs like
SLMB and QMB,213 and improved outreach would undoubtedly increase
participation. 14 However, to significantly improve enrolment in both
QMB and SLMB, HCFA and the states would need to commit more
resources to public information campaigns than they have in the past.
215
207 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(p)(l) (West Supp. 1999). For a discussion of the
shift of home health funding from Part A to Part B, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
208 For a summary of the comparatively more stringent QMB guidelines, see supra text
accompanying note 193.
209 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
210 This figure is based on the monthly Part B premium of $42.50. See Health Care Fin.
Admin., Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Medicare Cost Sharing and Premium Amounts for
Supplementary Medical Insurance (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
211 See MOON ETAL.,supra note 195.
212 See BARENTS GROUP LLC, supra note 193, at 60 tbl.3.
213 The Barents Group found that even some of the social service workers and community
groups providing services to the elderly had never heard of QMB or SLMB. See BARENTS GROUP
LLC, supra note 193, at 43. Another possible reason for low participation rates in these programs may
be the desire to avoid the "welfare stigma" attached to Medicaid funds. See Heidi Shaner, Dual
Eligible Outreach and Enrollment: A View from the States (Mar. 1999)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/o&erpt.htm>.
214 See Davis, supra note 177, at 9.
215 See. e.g., Shaner, supra note 213 (discussing state public-information campaigns and
noting that they "choose materials that are not overly expensive to produce, easy to develop and revise,
and uncomplicated to disseminate"). For a summary of HCFA public-information efforts to date, see
HCFA Central Office Current and Previous Activities (last modified Apr. 8, 1999)
<http://wwwihcfa.gov/medicaid/decoact.htm>. HCFA is currently studying ways of improving its
dual-eligible outreach activities. See HCFA Market Research for Medicaid: Project Description and
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Moreover, the inherent complexity of the criteria associated with these




The extent of the financial burden borne by Medicare home health
recipients depends, to a large extent, upon the way in which cost-sharing is
constructed. To conduct a comprehensive assessment of the relative merits
of various cost-sharing strategies would exceed the scope of this Note.
217
However, an assessment of the most salient proposals for Medicare home
health reveals that some strategies are more normatively acceptable than
others. Even so, vertical equity concerns remain under even the most
benign cost-sharing proposal, while the gains associated with these more
benign strategies may be so slight as not to justify the costs.
I consider three cost-sharing scenarios with the greatest potential
normative appeal: (1) a modest copayment ($3-$5) combined with an out-
of-pocket maximum;218 (2) modest coinsurance (5%-10%) combined with
an out-of-pocket maximum; and (3) a low deductible. As discussed above,
certain strategies-such as a 20% coinsurance rate without an out-of-
pocket maximum-would unreasonably burden beneficiaries. However,
the three strategies outlined above are potentially less burdensome to long-
term-care recipients and high-utilizers. It is possible to calibrate either the
out-of-pocket maxima posited in the first two scenarios or the deductible
proposed in the third strategy so that higher-utilization beneficiaries do not
incur more than, for example, $400 per year in cost-sharing. However,
even $400 is a substantial sum for beneficiaries with annual incomes of,
say, $10,000, beneficiaries who generally fail to qualify for QMB or
Medicaid coverage. 219 Moreover, limiting cost-sharing liability in this
fashion also limits potential fiscal cost-savings. Indeed, when one
considers the administrative costs associated with implementing such a
Preliminary Results (last modified Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/demktrpt.htm>.
216 The Barents Group study found that many beneficiaries were confused about eligibility
requirements. Many believed that their incomes or assets were too high or were confused about where
to apply. It is therefore unsurprising that some beneficiaries do not think that the benefits of the
program outweigh the time and effort costs of enrolling. See BARENTS GROUP LLC, supra note 193, at
44.
217 For a useful discussion of cost-sharing arrangements in health care, see Rice & Morrison,
supra note 30, at 264-74. For a discussion of possible means of modifying Medicare cost-sharing, see
Anderson et al., supra note 31, at 23-24.
218 MedPAC advocates imposing a per visit copayment subject to an out-of-pocket
maximum and an exemption for persons with low incomes. See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note
22, at 94-95.
219 The 1999 poverty guideline is $8240 for an individual. SeeAnnual Update of the HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,428, 13,428 (1999). 120% of this figure (the income level above
which QMB funding is denied) is $9888.
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cost-sharing program, the net benefits of cost-sharing may be exceedingly
modest. Thus, the net gains from these three cost-sharing strategies are
likely to be negligible, while vertical-equity considerations-albeit
moderated-would persist.
Two alternative approaches to cost-sharing--exempting lower-
income beneficiaries and restricting cost-sharing to home health aide
services-suffer from similar defects. Tying cost-sharing to income
potentially could alleviate vertical-equity problems, depending on how
such a system were devised.Y° However, income-related cost-sharing is
susceptible to significant administrative costs and practical
impediments.22' Moreover, exempting an entire income group--many of
whom generate a disproportionate amount of home health costs-from
cost-sharing would limit the program's intended fiscal savings.
Alternatively, one might be tempted to apply cost-sharing only to
home health aide services, in light of the particularly strong growth in that
sector and the greater likelihood of substitution of informal or self care.
However, long-term care beneficiaries, such as patients with
cerebrovascular diseases or ostearthrosis, often require home health aide
assistance for basic living tasks. Given the significant proportion of
chronically ill beneficiaries who live alone, one should not be overly
optimistic about their capacity to substitute informal care for home health
aide services. More fundamentally, restricting home health aide services
through cost-sharing places the greatest burden on the chronically ill, who
rely the most on these services.
VI. Alternatives
The case for beneficiary cost-sharing proves even less compelling in
light of the potential for fiscal reduction through alternative means.
Existing cost-reduction strategies and additional techniques yet to be
employed should be more than sufficient to contain effectively home
health costs while respecting norms of vertical equity. A combination of
220 Thomas Rice and Kenneth Thorpe have passionately advocated income-related cost-
sharing. See Rice & Thorpe, supra note 106; cf MOON, supra note 102, at 126 (describing an income-
related Part B premium). MedPAC advocates exempting lower-income persons from Medicare home-
health cost-sharing. See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94-95.
221 As Rice & Morrison note, the administrative problems associated with income-related
cost-sharing include: (I) "determining wages or incomes for the entire population, particularly those
who are not employed"; (2) "modifying the income tax system to allow for end-of-year credits or
additional cost-sharing payments"; and (3) "accounting for changing personal or economic
circumstances" (e.g., getting married or changing jobs). Rice & Morrison, supra note 30, at 272.
Although a "smart card" issued to lower-income beneficiaries might reduce some of these barriers, it
would introduce administrative burdens of its own, in addition to privacy concerns. See id. For further
discussion of the administrative barriers to income-related cost-sharing, see Conrad & Marmor, supra
note 30, at 212-17. But see Rice & Thorpe, supra note 106, at 35-36 (rejecting the import of the
administrative burden argument and arguing for the feasibility of income-related cost-sharing).
Yale Journal on Regulation
the following measures should be sufficient for these purposes: the IPS
and eventual PPS, existing and additional anti-fraud measures, improved
case-management and utilization review, better physician oversight and
discharge planning, and additional clinical work in developing norms by
which physicians and nurses can gauge the quality and effectiveness of
home health care. Although a comprehensive discussion of each of these
measures would exceed the scope of this Note, I hope to illustrate their
viability and potential effectiveness.
A. IPS and PPS
While both techniques pose some risks, the IPS and PPS should be
given an opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness. The IPS is
undoubtedly an inappropriate long-term strategy given the risks to
chronically ill beneficiaries and the inadequate incentive structure facing
providers under its cost-based reimbursement methodology. 222 However,
the IPS already seems to have moderated growth in the home health
industry223 and is likely to continue moderating home health expansion as
HCFA prepares to implement the PPS.
Although hardly free from risk, the PPS holds great potential for
reducing costs without endangering health outcomes. Perhaps encouraged
by some of the gains attributable to the Medicare hospital PPS,224 many
have called for prospective payment as a means of reining in the perceived
excesses in home health growth. 22' A recent HCFA demonstration of a
home health PPS based on per visit payment generated negligible cost-
savings, while creating no adverse health consequences for
beneficiaries.226 Perhaps cognizant of the risks and possibly marginal
222 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The IPS may also hurt Medicare's vulnerable
chronically ill population, as it may force agencies to reduce the frequency of visits or the level of staff
who are treating the most chronically ill patients. See Study Finds Medicare Home Health Interim
Payment System May Affect Most Vulnerable Patients: Beneficiaries and Providers May Face Risks
Lewin Group Cautions, NAHC REP., Mar. 20, 1998, at 6.
223 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Growth in hospital costs under the PPS rose
during the 1980s, yet have declined since the early 1990s. See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22,
at 52-53 & fig.3-1. One study noted the following health effects in the wake of the hospital PPS:
mortality rates following hospitalization were lower or unchanged; improvements in in-hospital
processes of care that began prior to the PPS continued after its introduction; and the PPS increased the
likelihood that a patient would be discharged in an unstable condition. See William H. Rogers et al.,
Quality of Care Before and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System: A
Summary of Effects, 264 JAMA 1989 (1990).
225 See, e.g., KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32, at 14-17; Weissert et al., supra note 132, at
367-69. For an interesting discussion of the possible ramifications of prospective payment, see
Kathleen N. Lohr et al., IMPACT OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL
CARE: A RESEARCH AGENDA, R-3242-HCFA (Mar. 1985). For a discussion of how PPS intersects
with "optimal insurance" theory, see Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Insurance Principles and
the Design of Prospective Payment Systems, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 215 (1988).
226 See Randall Brown et al., Research on Sub-Acute Care Issues, 32 HEALTH SERV. RES.
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for cost reduction and maintenance of provider quality.
B. Reducing Fraud and Abuse
The numerous anti-fraud measures enacted in recent years and
additional techniques to limit fraud and abuse should also prove effective
in curbing home-health costs. In addition to the anti-fraud measures noted
in Part 1,232 which may already have been effective in moderating the
growth of the home health benefit,233 HCFA could improve the
certification process for HHAs.3  Moreover, HCFA could send
beneficiaries a detailed bill outlining the services used, thereby making
them more cost-conscious and helping them police provider fraud.235
Congressional establishment of clearer eligibility and coverage guidelines
would also help deter spurious claims.2 36 While HCFA will undoubtedly
incur administrative costs through some of these measures, many of these
costs would be one-time expenditures associated with the initial framing of
regulations and criteria. Ultimately, a mixture of supply- and demand-side
measures to curb fraud holds great promise.
C. Improved Medical Oversight
Home health costs and unnecessary services could be reduced further
by improving quality control and physician oversight. First, improved
discharge-planning following hospital stays could reduce unnecessary
referrals to HHAs.237 Second, many doctors and nurses lack effective
training in geriatric care and rehabilitative medicine;2 3' better training in
this domain would improve the capacity of medical personnel to assess the
value of referrals and of continuing home health care. Third, physicians
and nurses would also benefit from improved clinical work establishing
guidelines by which to assess the efficacy and quality of home health care.
Although some progress has been made in this area,239 considerable
uncertainty and controversy exists in the medical community regarding the
note 23.
232 See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
234 See generally GAO CERTIFICATION, supra note 72.
235 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
236 See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 93.
237 For a summary of the statutory and regulatory basis for discharge-planning, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(ee) (1994); and 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 (1994). See also MEDICARE COVERAGE AND APPEALS,
supra note 51, at 13 & n.53; Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., Medicare Discharge-Planning Regulations. An
Advocacy Toolfor Beneficiaries, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 152 (1995).
238 See Bogardus Interview, supra note 129.
239 See Kane et al., supra note 131; Peter W. Shaughnessy et al., Measuring and Assuring the
Quality of Home Health Care, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1994, at 35.
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benefits of a per visit method,227 however, HHS has proposed a per
episode basis for the home health PPS.22 Indeed, under a recent HCFA per
episode PPS demonstration for home health, per episode costs were
reduced by 13%, utilization by 17%, and average length of stay by 15%.229
Of course, much depends on the payment rates and conditions ultimately
imposed by HCFA. 23o Developing appropriate rates for the diverse home
health beneficiary and provider populations has indeed proven to be a
formidable task.23' However, despite these challenges, the PPS offers hope
397 (1997). But see Christine E. Bishop et al., The Home Health Visit. An Appropriate Unit for
Medicare Payment?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 145, 148 (questioning the per visit method and
noting that home health aide visits were much shorter under HCFA's per visit PPS demonstration);
Barbara R. Phillips et al., Do Preset Per Visit Payment Rates Affect Home Health Agency Behavior?,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1994, at 91, 91 (finding "no compelling evidence of any impact
on cost per visit, volume of home health services, agency revenue and profit, patient selection and
retention, quality of care, or use and cost of Medicare services"). For a good summary of the findings
of the HCFA demonstration project, see Medicare Program: Prospective Payment System for Home
Health Agencies, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,134, 58,137-38 (1999) [hereinafter Medicare Program].
227 Under the per visit method, agencies have an incentive to reduce average cost per visit
and to increase the number of visits they provide. Some agency strategies, such as reducing overhead
or wages, would not affect the content of home health visits. However, HHAs also might choose to
spread treatment out over the course of more visits to maximize Medicare payment. See Bishop et al.,
supra note 226, at 146-47. There might also be a bias in favor of patients requiring numerous visits, as
opposed to sporadic, skill-intensive interventions. Such a bias generally would not be adverse to the
interests of the chronically ill, yet might put those with more acute needs at greater risk.
228 See Medicare Program, 64 Fed. Reg. at 58,208. Under the proposed rule, HCFA would
employ a 60-day episode as the basic unit of payment to providers. An individual would be covered for
60 days of care regardless of the number of days of care actually provided during the 60-day period,
subject to certain exceptions.
229 See Shalala Reports, supra note 24. For further discussion of the HCFA per episode
demonstration, see Medicare Program, 64 Fed. Reg. at 58,138-40. The significant results obtainable
under a per episode PPS thus further undermine MedPAC's suggestion that Congress authorize per
visit copayments as a complement to the PPS. See supra note 25. If a per episode PPS is capable of
achieving the kind of cost reductions indicated above, then the further addition of copayments is
unnecessary and potentially harmful, in light of the equity considerations discussed in preceding
sections.
In contrast with the 60-day unit recently proposed by HCFA, the per episode demonstration
project limited treatment episodes to periods of 120 days or less. See KENNEY & MOON, supra note 32,
at 15. Under the recently proposed PPS, there is no limit to the number of episodes a given beneficiary
may experience. As long as the patient obtains, inter alia, a physician certification upon the expiration
of each 60-day period, coverage continues. See Telephone Interview with Sally Kaplan, Medicare
Payment Commission (MedPAC) (Dec. 21, 1999). Thus, the PPS would not limit access to care by
long-term care users, who experience home health episodes in excess of 60 days, an outcome that
comports with considerations of vertical equity.
230 The data from the Outcomes and Assessment Information Set (OASIS), which HCFA is
in the process of compiling, will serve as the basis for the prospective payment rates ultimately set by
HCFA. In addition to facilitating case-mix adjustment, OASIS will also provide valuable standards by
which HCFA can assess quality of care and outcomes. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Use of
the OASIS as Part of the Conditions of Participation for Home Health Agencies, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,035,
11,036 (1997). For a discussion of HCFA's progress thus far in developing case-mix adjustment
parameters, see Medicare Program, 64 Fed. Reg. at 58,140-42, 58,172-86.
In January 1999, the NAHC expressed concern that hasty development and implementation of
the PPS would limit the industry's opportunities for involvement and would affect negatively the
PPS's ultimate form. See Shalala Reports, supra note 24. It remains to be seen whether HCFA's recent
efforts will prove sufficient to allay industry fears.
231 For a discussion of the difficulties in developing the appropriate "case-mix," see supra
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efficacy of home health care.240 Fourth, Congress should consider
requiring an independent assessment of need for beneficiaries receiving
extensive home health care. 4'
D. Utilization Review and Case Management
Finally, some form of enhanced utilization review and case-
management procedures could be developed for Medicare home health
beneficiaries. The claims review process conducted by Medicare
intermediaries approximates a kind of utilization review,242 yet is
underfunded and sporadic.243 HCFA should encourage intermediaries to
conduct more vigilant claim reviews and give them more funding to make
such assessments. Moreover, HCFA could require that providers take a
more active role in conducting internal utilization reviews. The pressure
exerted by the PPS on HHAs to reduce costs would provide a further
incentive for HHAs to assist in this process. Finally, the third-party
assessment of need, discussed above, might be folded into a broader
utilization review.
Case management, 2" which has been employed by the states in their
administration of Medicaid benefits, including home health,245 could also
be attempted in Medicare. Such an effort would require that case managers
take into account the unique health needs of beneficiaries, while remaining
cognizant of cost considerations. Case managers could aid in discharge
planning in the post-acute setting, assessing the relative merits of SNF,
home health care, and other treatment. Managers could also conduct an
examination of the needs and usage of high-utilizer and long-term care
cohorts within the home health population. However, HCFA would need
to make certain that the reduction in Medicare expenditures and improved
240 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
241 See 1999 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 22, at 94. Whereas doctors and nurses may face
incentives to over-prescribe services under the IPS, providers under an episode-based PPS would have
an incentive to stint on care. Although not free from practical difficulties and cost considerations, an
independent assessment would address the problems associated with these incentive structures. See id.
242 For a discussion of utilization review techniques in the private sector, see Mark J.
Schlesinger et al., Medical Professionalism Under Managed Care: The Pros and Cons of Utilization
Review, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 106.
243 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
244 Case management has been defined by the Commission for Case Manager Certification
as "a collaborative process that assesses, plans, implements, coordinates, monitors, and evaluates the
options and services required to meet an individual's health needs, using communication and available
resources to promote quality, cost-effective outcomes." CCM CERTIFICATION GUIDE: CERTIFIED CASE
MANAGER (1992).
245 For a discussion of the use of case-management techniques by the states, see GAO,
GAO/PEMD-94-19, LONG-TERM CARE: STATUS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE AND MEASUREMENT IN
HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 17-18 (1994); and GAO, GAO/HEMS-94-167, MEDICAID
LONG-TERM CARE: SUCCESSFUL STATE EFFORTS To EXPAND HOME SERVICES WHILE LIMITING
COSTS 12 (1994).
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efficacy of treatment justify the administrative costs associated with
utilization-review and case-management techniques. Ultimately, effective
case-management and utilization-review techniques would also require
enhanced clarity regarding the efficacy and appropriateness of home health
services.
Conclusion
The Medicare home health benefit is a singularly poor candidate for
beneficiary cost-sharing. The difficulty of determining when home health
care is medically "necessary," in addition to the inherent bluntness of cost-
sharing as an instrument for deterring frivolous usage, undermines the case
for home-health cost-sharing. More fundamentally, the vulnerability of the
target population presents significant vertical equity concerns. The
availability of Medigap policies, Medicaid, and programs such as QMB
and SLMB fails to mitigate these concerns. Moreover, while the more
benign variants of cost-sharing may present less pressing vertical equity
concerns, they would not reap sufficient reductions in Medicare
expenditures to justify the administrative costs and other difficulties
inherent in their construction. My analysis of the numerous alternative
measures available for containing home health costs-PPS, improved
oversight, and utilization-review techniques-underscores th.. need for
more creative solutions to the home health problem. The traditional
reliance upon beneficiary cost-sharing in public insurance programs must
yield to an openness to alternatives.
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Figure 4. Trends in the Six Most Frequent Medicare
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Figure 5. Responsiveness of the Demand for Medical
Care with No Insurance (Dn), 50% Copayment (D50),
and 20% Copayment (D20).
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Figure 6. Percent of Medicare Home Health Users and
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Figure 8. Percent of Medicare Home Health Users with
Selected Characteristics (Comparison of "High
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